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FEw 285Abstract
The present research memorandum reviews on and evaluates the many
efforts of establishing collective preferences. The first section is de-
voted to a broad discussion of the a priori as well as the ex post ap-
proaches. The a priori concept clearly appears to be second to the ex post
one. The latter starts from the implicit preferences idea and recognises
that planning behavior involves constrained optimisation conditional on
expectations of the future while constraints and the information set are
relatively well understood. Moreover, it takes into account policy deci-
sions do not follow simple repeated optimalisations. Two alternative de-
termination models for implicit preference structures are highlighted in
the second section. It is argued that the (D)eterministic (S)tatic (I)m-
plicit (D)etermination model takes care of results not being influenced
anymore by the a priori functional form of the preference function. Also
the problems of the second order conditions for an optimum have been over-
come now by the use of the concept of the relative preference elasticity.
The second alternative of the 'Interactive Respecification' model seems to
reconstruct by a pseudo-simulation of a given policy choice the characte-
ristics of planning behavior and the underlying preference structure in
more detail compared with the D.S.I.D-model approach. Nevertheless, the
present paper concludes that the former way of doing may deliver reasons
perhaps why the D.S.I.D.-approach has to be preferred, especially if the
attention is merely turned to test stability through time of relative
preference elasticities rather than to simulate the planning behavior in
itself.An Exercise in Welfare Economics (II)
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An E;xercise in Welfare Economics (II)
Introduction: 'Problems of quantitative determination of an optimal econo-
mic poliCy'
This paper is intended to be a global overview how in literature on wel-
fare economics research workers tried to get rid of solving problems which
fall within the realm of welfare economics; the latter being defined as
that branch of economic science which aims at evaluating the social desir-
ability of alternative economic states. We define an economic state as a
particular arrangement of economic activities, implying a well-defined use
of the resources available to the economy. States of the economy may dif-
fer in many respects, e.g. in the structure and the functioning of the
economy, but we can always say that each state is characterized by a dif-
ferent allocation of resources and a different distribution of the rewards
for economic activity.
In order to make it possible to transform one state of the economy into
another, policy measures have to be available for changing an existing and
undesirable situation. However, before being able to take these measures
the policy decision making unit of an economy will need an instrument in
order to analyze when and what decisions are to be taken so as to ultima-
tely bring about the desired situation.
In the literature, various tools, i.e. policy decision models, have been
developed. Two of them are the flexible target and the policy simulation
models. The synthesis of these two models resulting in the possibility for
the policy decision unit of ultimately arriving at an optimal control of a
national economy should be emphasizedl). The flexible target-policy simu-
lation model fits exactly into the framework of systems of quantitative
economic planning postulated by the mere part of research workers in that
field and this can be presented in the following schematic way:
(I.a) There is e set A of feasible actions for the policy decision making
unit, the elements of which are denoted by the action vector a. An action
results in a state s, i.e. s is a set of functions s- f(a) of the action2
taken. The set of possible states of the economy S is generated by s-
f(a) when a varies over the set A. -
The policy decision making unit has to decide on what action to take ac-
cording to some 'social' preferences concerning S. Decision making on what
action to take in accordance with some social preferences concerning al-
ternative states of the economy can be performed by maximizing a social
welfare function: w- w(s) subject to side conditions describing the func-
tíoning of the economy under given policy measures s- f(a). The social
welfare function may be defined as describing a ranking of society's wel-
fare, a function of the satisfaction levels of individuals composing so-
ciety; its form depends on value judgements about the possible economic
states of all the individuals of a society (e.g. a country). In a truly
national economy it is the policy decision making unit, which undertakes
the decision making with regard to social welfare maximization. Such a
unit may consist of one or more representatives of the whole group of
individuals of a country. Because each individual representative not only
maximizes the welfare of individuals, but also wants to assure his own
political survival, a social welfare function of the policy decision ma-
king group is likely to be a preference function which has become partly
independent of the preferences (value judgements) of all other individuals
in a country.
Therefore, the term 'social preference function', or just preference func-
tion of the policy decision making unit, is to be preferred to that of
'social welfare function'. Besides that, the name of collective preference
function occurs in the literature. It indicates the close relation between
this p.f. of the policy decision making unit and the collectivity of the
individual preference functions of the members of the unit. Such a collec-
tive preference function may be considered to be a function denoting a
kind of compromise arrived at by the policy makers with regard to the
individual preference orderings on the possible states of the economy.
They accept this collective preference function as being the function on
which optimal joint decisíon making about actions and their resulting
states of the economy can be achieved by means of quantitative optimiza-
tion techniques. If the policy decision making unit does not consist of
democratically elected members representing the whole group of a democra-
cy, but only of one non-democratically elected person, we are dealing with3
the case of a dictatorship. Here optimal decision making will be based on
the individual preference function of the dictator.
In reality, when computing an optimal economic policy by means of quanti-
tative optimization techniques, the collective preference function or the
dictatorial p.f. are supposed to be single valued objective functions
which are maximized subject to some functional (economic) side conditions.
The objective function consists of all the target variables possibly with
some of the instrument variables of economic policy. Research workers
often postulate that the vector s of economic states in the mentioned
social welfare function may be translated into terms of all the policy
target- and instrumentvariables, so w- w(s) will be transformed into the
preference function:
~ - ~(y,?) (I.b)
where y and z are the vectors of the policy target and instrument vari-
ables respectively. Preference function (I.b) is to be maximized subject
to the side conditions of an economy which may be described by a macro-
economic model, expressing the functional relations between the different
variables of the economy, i.e. the relation s- f(a) will be transformed
into the macro economic model:
f(y; v; z; x; y-; v-; e) - 0
where y and z have already been defined; v and x denote irrelevant endoge-
nous resp. uncontrollable (exogenous) variables; y- and v- denote lagged
endogenous variables and 0 is the null-vector. e stands for the vector of
constant terms.
We shall often use the terms 'preference function' snd 'individual prefe-
rence function', to denote the collective preference function of a policy
decision making unit and the preference function of one individual policy
decision maker respectively.4
Summing up we can say that optimal policy management by means of quantita-
tive optimization techniques needs quantitative knowledge of the preferen-
ce function and of the economic side conditions. Besides, an appropriate
quantitative optimization technique must be available. In spite of the
fact that econometrics and operations research have succeeded in a satis-
factory way in developing econometric models and optimization techniques,
it still appears difficult to arrive at numerically determined preference
functions.2~
As said already one of the main aims of the present paper is to give a
global overview of literature we studied during the last decade when we
off and on made efforts in explaining social preference functions e.g. for
Belgium, France and the Netherlands and looking for important characteris-
tics of the preference structure underlying such functions.3~
The results of such theoretlcal and empirical investigation may give a
better insight into the preference behaviour of the postulated quantita-
tive policy decision making units in these countriea. It can tell us,
among other things, whether the relative preferences of a decision making
unit are constant over time or not; the answer to this question is impor-
tant in view of the aim to arrive ultimately at the possibility of check-
ing whether the implicitly pursued aims correspond to the ones that have
been stated, too, and over which time period they have been active.
Section I.A. General Background
Par. I.A.1. Economic Policy Management
Since the nineteenth century economics has dealt with the problem of un-
derstanding the functioning of the economic system in order to discover by
what kind of policies it could be steered in certain directions.
The main objectives of national economic policy were and still are equal
distribution of increasing wealth. However, up to the second world war,
the tasks of economic policy were mainly thought of as the creation of an
institutional framework which provided the best environment for the opera-
tion of market forces, and not as the study of the effects of direct mani-
pulations of those forces.5
Nowadays all main political forces as well as the general public in the
capitalist economies accept the idea that governmental policy decision
making units can and should assume responsibility for the 'management' of
these economies. Management is generally considered to be successful when
it achieves at least the simultaneous attainment of the following six
objectives:
1. Full employment
2. A sound balance of payments
3. A sufficient rate of growth of the economy.
4. A reasonable distribution of incomes.
5. Price stability.
6. Protection of the environment.
Especially Keynes has stimulated the process of thinking about the tasks
of economic policy4~. He showed how the economy could be managed so as to
secure the full utilization of resources, in particular full employment of
labour, mainly by governmental actions in the fiscal and monetary field
without any radical change in the institutional framework of a market
economy.
However, merely accepting the idea of the possibility of managing the
national economy does not solve all the problems of this aspect of welfare
economics. In the years after the second world war there was little under-
standing of the difficulties which arose in attempting to achieve all
objectives of economic policy simultaneously, or, if they were not
achieved or came into open conflict with one another, of the ways in which
government policy was to be conducted. Kaldor5~ concludes that in the
language of present-day econometrics, the failure of postwar governments
to pursue policies consistent with their declared objectives, could be
primarily due to an insufficient orchestration of instruments i.e. to not
having sufficient separate policy instruments at hand to secure the simul-
taneous attainment of the various objectives. Formally speaking, the basic
cause of the failures of economic policy management was the attempt to
achieve too much with too little understanding of the full implications of
the principles of economic policy management.
In recent years this understanding has increased; for the managers of
national economic policy i.e. those who make the decisions with regard to6
and are engaged in practical welfare economics have increasingly come to
feel a need for criteria with which to evaluate the effects of alternative
economic policies on the behaviour of an economic system.
Econometric literature on economic policy management indicates various
ways of analyzing those effects and in doing so it makes use of macroeco-
nometric models whether or not with explicitely stated preference func-
tions of the policy management unit.
Par. 1.A.2. Models of economic p-olicy management6)
Four main models for computing policy vectors, including an analysis of
their effects on the behaviour of an economic system can be distinguished.
1. T'he fixed target policy model.
2. The flexible target policy model.
3. The mixed fixed-flexible target policy model.
4. The policy simulation model.
Each model has been derived from a given econometric model of the economy
of the country in question, embodied in a set of simultaneous equations,
linear or non-linear. If such a model is assumed to be linear and determi-
nistic, it shows the following structural form:
Ayt t Bvt t Czt t Dxt
} pAp~t-p } pp~t-p `
e- 0 (I.A.2.a)
where:
Yt is an Jxl vector of target variables.
vt is an Ixl vector of irrelevant endogenous variables.
zt is an Kxl vector of policy instrument variables.
xt is an Lxl vector of non-controlled exogenous variables.
yt-p is an Jxl vector of lagged target variables (p-1,.....,P).
vt-p is an Ixl vector of lagged irrelevant endogenous variables
(P-1,... ,P).
e is an Nxl vector of the constant terms.
A is an NxJ coefficient matrix corresponding the vector xt.
B is an NxI coefficient matrix corresponding to the vector vt.
C is an NxK coefficient matrix corresponding to the vector zt.D is an NxL coefficient matrix corresponding to the vector xt.
Ap is the NxJ coefficient matrix corresponding to the vector xt-p
(P-1, .. ,P).
BP is the NxI coefficient matrix corresponding to the vector vt- - p
(P-1. .. ,P)
0 is the Nxl null vector.
t denotes year t (t-1,....,T).
T denotes the horizon over which the economic evolution of a certain
economy is described or computed.
System (I.A.2.a) is assumed to be a complete model i.e. the number of
equations (N) equals the number of endogenous variables (J 4 I). The ele-
ments of yt and vt are the endogenous variables of model (I.A.2.a) whereas
the elements of zt, xt, yt-p and vt-P are exogenous at a given time t.
The four main models of economic policy management will be reviewed in
brief.
Par. I.A.2.1: The Fixed Target Policy Model
Setting up this policy model assumes that instruments of economic policy
could be applied to reach targets for~ which certain fixed values are spe-
cified by the policy decision making unit of a national economy.
For the given values of all the exogenous variables without zt, i.e xt,
yt-P and vt-p in system (I.A.2.a), the equations of this econometric model
are solved simultaneously for the set of values of the policy instruments
zt and those of the irrelevant endogenous variables vt that are consistent
with the fixed-valued target variables xt.
In analyzing and solving the problems in the framework of the fixed target
policy approach we may distinguish:
(1) The analytical problem of expressing the target variables yt in terms
of the instruments zt and the non-controllable variables xt and yt-p,
for the solution of which the variables vt and vt-p should be elimi-
nated.a
Literature~) gives the necessary conditions for arriving ultimately at the
solution of the 'analytical problem' consisting of the so-called 'reduced
form' of model (I.A.2.a). Transforming the original matrices and vectors
of system (I.A.2.a), one obtains:
Yt - S?t t Tut (I.A.2.l.a)
where:
yt is the Jxl vector of target variables in system (I.A.2.a).
zt is the Kxl vector of instruments.
ut is an (LtPtl) x 1 vector of the non-controllable variables taking
into account a constant term derived from the standard operations
on the vector e of system (I.A.2.a). (All elements of this vector
ut are predetermined).
S is a JxK coefficient matrix.
T is a Jx (LtP41) coefficient matrix.
(2) The political problem of expressing the instruments zt in terms of the
target variables xt and the vector ut in system (I.A.2.l.e); so we may
derive:
zt - S-lyt - S-1.T.ut, (I.A.2.l.b)
assuming matrix S is non-singular.
Par. I.A.2.2. The Flexible Target Policy Model
To derive this policy model from system (I.A.2.a) one has to assume the
existence of a preference function c~ of (I.b). For the time being we shall
describe u as being a single-valued objective function, corresponding to a
weighted average of the flexible targets and instruments of the national
economy in year t.
Supposing a quadratic mathematical form we can write for (I.b):
(I.A.2.2.a)9
where:
P nnd ~ represr.nt diagonal matrices with only J and K coefficients on
their main diagonals which correspond to the vectors xt respectively zt.
The problem of the policy decision making unit consists in finding the
values of ~t and zt that will maximize ~t of (Z.A.2.2.a) subject to the
constraints imposed by the econometric model (I.A.2.a) for predetermined
values of xt, ~t-p and vt-p. We may derive the necessary conditions arri-
ving ultimately at the solution of the flexible target model, using the
classical solution technique for maximizing a function c~t of (I.A.2.2.a)
subject to the constraints of system (I.A.2.a). Using the results obtained
in I.A.2.1 our problem consists of maximizing ~t of (I.A.2.2.a) subject to
the linear constraints of (I.A.2.l.a).
Applying the classical solution technique and performing certain standard
matrix operations we get the following optimal policy instrument vector:
~` -1 w
zt - - [QtS PS] S. P.T.ut (I.A.2.2.b)
M
provided the second order conditions are met in the optimum i.e. Q4S PS is
negative (semi-)definite.
Par. I.A.2.3. The Fixed-Flexible Target Policy Model
Here the policy decision making unit is dealing with minimizing an ob-
jective function the arguments of which are the deviations of the realised
values of the target- and instrument variables from their fixed 'ideal'
values.
This approach implies an intermediate form between the approaches of the
fixed and the flexible target policy models described in I.A.2.1 and
I.A.2.2.
Suppose the objective function which has to be minimized has the following
mathematical form:
c~t - Ixt -~td1
~ Plyt -~tdJ
t I zt - ztdJ






is the Jxl vector of the target variables of which the 'desired
ideal' values are fixed by the policy decision making unit for a
certain year t.
is the Kxl vector of the instrument variables of which the 'de-
sired ideal' values are fixed by deriving them from the relations
between ztd and xtd ( see systems (I.A.2.l.a) and (I.A.2.l.b)).
Minimizing ~t of (I.A.2.3.a) subject to system (I.A.2.a) will produce the
same result as maximizing the following objective function
~t -- fyt - ytdJ
N Plxt - ytdJ
- Izt - ztdJ
N Qlzt - ztd~
(I.A.2.3.b)
subject to the same constraints as in system (I.A.2.a).
Making use again of the reduced form of model ( I.A.2.a) i.e. taking into
account of the side conditions expressed by the linear system ( I.A.2.l.a),
the classical optimization technique yields the following optimal zt vec-
tor:
N N N N A





is the optimal Kxl instrument vector which maximizes ~rt of
(I.A.2.3.b) subject to the linear constraints of (I.A.2.l.a) and
minimizes ~t of (I.A.2.3.a) subject to the same linear con-
straints.11
Par. I.A.2.4. The Policy Simulation Model
The policy simulation approach requires no prior knowledge neither of the
preference function nor of the policy decision making unit.
By means of simulation one solves the set of simultaneous equations of
system (I.A.2.a) for the target variables xt and the irrelevant endogenous
variables vt in terms of xt, yt-p, vt-p and zt. One may generate the time-
paths of yt and vt for as long a period (horizon) as one wishes. The time-
path of yt i.e. the vector consisting of calculated values of the target
variables for each year t is of course the object of the special interest
of the policy decision making unit.
In using it for policy simulation, we may transform system (I.A.2.a) in
the following 'normalized' form:
L
xtJ
--[A B]-1.rCz t Dx t E A x t i B v tel (I.A.2.4.a) vt L-t -t p p t-p p-t-p -J
where:
[~t~
is the (J t I) xl vector of the endogenous variables and
[A B]-1 is the normal inverse of [A B] to be supposed a non-singular (JtI)
x (JfI) matrix.
For any given values of the policy instruments one can generate the time-
paths of the endogenous variables, using system (I.A.2.4.a) because the
values of xt, xt-p and vt-p are supposed to be predetermined (t-1,...,T;
where T denotes the horizon of the simulation).
Par. I.A.3. Evaluation of the economic policy management models
In I.A.3.1 we shall evaluate the policy management models briefly reviewed
in the preceding paragraphs. Besides, in I.A.3.2 we shall indicate another
possible way of analyzing the effects of alternative economic policies on
the behaviour of an economic system i.e. the flexible target-policy simu-
lation model.12
Par. I.A.3.1. The four main policy models
In section I.A.2 the fixed target policy model was mentioned first.
Tinbergen who introduced this approach, in principle suggests the exís-
tence of a preference function, but he gces on right away to deny the
possibility of knowing this function of the policy decision msking unit,
mainly because of the lack of knowledge of its mathematical form.
In the fixed target policy approach we are not faced with a maximization
problem as we are in the cases of the fixed-flexible respectively flexible
target approach (cfr. I.A.2.1, I.A.2.2 and I.A.2.3). Targets are fixed and
instruments to reach these targets can only be applied by taking into
account boundary conditions on the practical use of the instruments. In
reality the way in which the values of the targets are specified, taking
into account the boundary conditions of the national economy has to result
from a reasonable discussion between the responsible policy makers of a
democratically governed country in which economic planning is a generally
accepted way of life.
Often the target values are chosen as the highest (or lowest) possible
values considered attainable by the policy maker e.g. values that might
correspond to at least the main objectives of 'successful management'
mentioned in paragraph I.A.1.
The way in which the values of the targets have to be fixed in democrati-
cally governed countries i.e. by reasonable discussion, seems to be one of
the practical constraints imposed on the use of the fixed target policy
model for application to practical policy msnagement. Many experts think
it highly questionable that in big countries like the United States a
policy maker is willing to commit himself to a specific set of values for
the target variables and the irrelevant endogenous variables. It is doubt-
ful whether the policymaker will reveal the values of his targets in a
precise manner. Thus, the information needed for solving the fixed target
policy model is simply not available to the analyst, who finally likes to
analyse the effects of alternative economic policies on the behaviour of
an economic system e.g. of the U.S., by using the fixed target policy
model.
Another practical constraint of this policy model can be mentioned. When
taking a look at the systems I.A.2.a, I.A.2.l.a and I.A.2.l.b, we see that13
a solution of the fixed target policy model can only be obtained if the
number of instruments (- K) at least the number of targets equals (- J).
If there are fewer policy instrument variables than targets, the number of
unknowns (i.e. the policy instruments) in the econometric model I.A.2.a
and its 'reduced form' I.A.2.l.a is smaller than the number of equations
and a solution is impossible, except for specisl cases.
On the other hand, if the number of instruments exceeds the number of
targets, the number of unknowns will exceed the number of equations
(J ( K), and thus an infinite number of solutions will be possible. If J)
K, the 'Analytical problem' mentioned in I.A.2.1 (1) can be solved only
either by increasing the number of instruments or by reducing the number
of targets until there is an equal number of equations and unknowns (J-K)
in (I.A.2.a) and (I.A.2.l.a).
The 'Political Problem' mentioned in I.A.2.1 (2) can be solved in those
cases in which K) J i.e. when the number of unknowns exceeds the number
of equations, by assigning arbitrary values to (k - J) instrument vari-
ables and by solving system I.A.2.l.a for the remaining non-arbitrarily
valued instrument variables.
One ought to admit that the problem of balancing the number of equations
and the number of instruments is frequently a serious limitation in the
practical application of the fixed target policy model to policy manage-
ment and thus also as an analysis model of the problems in this field of
welfare economics, especially because ( as we saw in par. I.A.1) the reali-
ty of economic policy merely shows far more targets than there are instru-
ments for attaining them.
The second analysis model of policy management mentioned in section I.A.2
was the flexible target model, especially emphasized by Theil. In this
approach not only the existence of a preference function is assumed but
also the possibility of deriving such a function for use in quantitative
optimal policy management and by means of objective mathematical optimiza-
tion techniques. It provides an instrument for a more flexible solution of
the problem of specifying numerically the (fixed) targets in the fixed
target policy models, as well as of conflicts which may arise within the
group of policy makers. It will leave more room for action by aiming at14
msximizing the known preference function, taking into account the bounda-
ries of the economic system (i.e. the model of the economy).
However, the flexible target approach stands of falls with the question
whether or not it is possible to derive a numerically known preference
function. We shall return to this problem in par. I.A.4 and I.A.5. As
concerns the fixed-flexible target policy model, we can make the same
remarks as we did for the fixed-flexible target policy model (see solution
systems (I.A.2.2.b) and (I.A.2.3.c).
It corresponds to the flexible target approach in so far as we are dealing
with maximizing an objective function subject to the constraints of the
economic model by using, for instance, the classical mathematical optimi-
zation technique (see I.A.2.3.a and I.A.2.3.b).
The last model described in the preceding paragraph was a simulation one.
There we mentioned the capacity of the policy simulation model to generate
for any given values of the policy instruments, the time paths of the
endogenous variables of model (I.A.2.a). It does not assume a preference
function and many experts emphasize the simulation technique, because it
makes it possible for econometricians to put only two questions to the
policy maker:
1. "What output variables are of particular interest to you7"
2. "What sets of policy variables appear to be politically feasible?".
Simulation makes it easy for the economist to show the policy maker the
consequences of the proposed policies. Besides, he may propose a few poli-
cies of his own for consideration by the policy maker.
The latter can then select the policies that are most compatible with his
'implicit' preference function, which is unknown to the economist accor-
ding to many experts. The results of initisl simulation runs may suggest
other policy variable configurations for trial runs.
Par. I.A.3.2. Another Possibility
Evaluation of the four main policy models in I.A.3.1 makes clear that the
flexible target and the policy simulation models are more appropriate
analysis instruments than the fixed target or fixed-flexible target policy
models. They leave more room for analyzing the effects of alternative15
economic policies on the behaviour of an economic system especislly be-
cause they allow for more varied actions of the policy decision making
unit.
A synthesis of the two approaches will result in an even stronger applica-
tion and analysis instrument making possible 'optimal control' by the
policy decision making unit of an economic system. Such an synthesis can
be found with authors as Paelinck c.s.8~
However, with them we cannot speak yet of 'optimal control' because in
their model they do not as yet introduce a quantitative optimization tech-
nique. Accepting, however, the existence of a numerically known integral
preference function over time, and using it in their simulation model of
the Belgium economy, they are able to 'evaluate' the reactions of the
economy for a certain number of changes to a set of elementary policy
instrument variables, by performing a series of 'historical' and 'explora-
tory' runs.
If in such a simulation model a quantitative optimization technique is
introduced for maximizing the preference function subject to the side
condition of the economy, both being already integrated in the simulation
model, 'optimal control' by the policy decision making unit has become a
real possibility. One may now simulate optimal time paths in the future
with regard to the target as well as to the policy instrument variable.
Let us now turn to the discussion of some problems concerning the measure-
ment of preferences and derivation of numerically known preference func-
tions to be used in 'optimal control' models.
Par. I.A.~1. Measuring preferences and establishing preference functions9~
A brief review of the international economic literature already shows a
considerable disagreement about the possibility of obtaining useful prefe-
rence functions. There is similar disagreement about the possibility of
performing 'optimal control' on an economic system.
There are various reasons why many experts take this negative view. They
argue that operating with a preference function suffers from the shortco-
mings connected with the fact that in the real world we simply do not know
the contents, functional form and numerical parameters of c~.16
The Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index and other techniques for quanti-
fying preferences simply require too much information to obtain meaningful
results, information that is not likely to be forthcoming from either
present or future policy decision units. A policy decision maker whose
main concern is his own political survival is not going to reveal his
preference function to any economist.
The negative thinkers consider the several examples of hypothetical prefe-
rence functions for policy making decision units as proposed by economists
in the literature as only academic exercises, trying to evaluate the ef-
fects of economic policies with macro-econometric models and a preference
function te be optimized, which are not. likely to be very helpful for real
world policy decision units.
They prefer to spend less time trying to specify the preference function
and want to spend more time seeking solutions to some of the 'real' pro-
blems of the policy decision unit of a country.
However we think the problem of establishing a preference function is one
of those 'real' problems and to reject out of hand all the real possibili-
ties of arriving ultimately at optimal control models as being just beau-
tiful instruments in the laboratory of the academic economist is, we feel,
going too far. It cuts short one of the most promising possibilities of
economics of being able to indicate and to advise on optimal lines of
action for policy units in the future.
With regard to short-term planning as well as to long-term planning, many
others have arrived to the same conclusion.l0)
Any potential instrument for gaining a better insight into the problems of
policy making has to be investigated and will have to be the object of
further research, irrespective of the many hours to be spent in order to
get out of the stage of laboratory experimentation.
Before we shall review our own contribution in section I.B we want to
indicate some problems and the ways in which authors have tried to over-
come or to bypass them with regard to establishing numerically known pre-
ference functions.17
Par. I.A.5. Derivation of preference functions
Derivation of preference functions to be used for quantitative optimal
planning as described in scheme (I.a) requires the solution of two main
problems i.e.:
1. Specifying such a function of preference rankings on economic states
has to satisfy conditions of collective as well individual rationality
because the function will be used for decision making about those al-
ternative states of the economy to be preferred by the policy decision
making unit, the latter generally consisting of more than one indi-
vidual.
2. There are difficulties of quantification of the preference ranking
function.
The first of these two major problems concerns the fact that the preferen-
ce function, to be used in deciding on actions to be taken by the policy
decision unit, is assumed to be a function representing in some sense the
individual preference rankings of all the individual policy makers being
members of the unit. One can imagine such a preference function to be
derived either directly from all the individual preference functions of
these members or not.
Direct derivation of the p.f, from individual ones may be possible by
means of aggregating the individual p.f.'s to collective ones.
The aggregation procedure gives rise to problems with regard to conditions
of collective and individual rationality as well as with regard to the
technique to be used in order to actually perform the desired aggregation.
These problems will be discussed briefly in the next paragraphs I.A.5.1,
I.A.5.2 and I.A.5.3.
The second major problem referred to above results from the requirement of
having ultimately at one's disposal of a numerically known preference
function to be used for the optimization procedure mentioned in our scheme
of quantitative economic planning (I.a). Here we are dealing with problems
of specification of the mathematical form and contents of the p.f. in
(I.b) and besides with problems of determination of the numerical values
of its parameters. We shall discuss these in the paragraphs I.A.6 and18
I.A.~. These two paragraphs are devoted to the two different approaches
which are possible with regard to the numerical determination of the pre-
ference function i.e.:
1. The a priori approach and
2. The ex post approach.
The difference between these two approaches results from different think-
ing about the point of time at which one may establish a numerically known
preference function. Referring to our scheme (I.a) two possibilities, as
concerns this point of time, can be distinguished:
1. In the a priori approach, one tries to arrive at the numerically known
preference function, before that point of time at which decisions on
actions a are actually taken by the policy decision unit and. in doing
so, before the actually resulting states of the economy indicated by
the values of the target and instrument variables y and z in the p.f.
(I.b), caused by these actions, are known.
2. In the ex post approach, one tries to work out the numerically known
p.f. after the points of time in which the decisions are actuslly
taken; the resulting statea of the economy will be known by means of
observations of the values of target and instrument variables y and z
in the p.f. of (I.b).
The determination techniques to be used and the question of what informa-
tion will be desired in the two different approaches will be discussed in
paragraphs I.A.6 and I.A.~.
Par. I.A.5.1. Aggregation of individuel preference functions to 'collec-
tive' preference functions
Assuming the preference function which is used for quantitative optimal
planning, is in some way or other based on lower-level preference func-
tions, we may distinguish two alternatives as concerns the problem of
direct derivation of the preference function of a policy decísion unit
from the individual preference functions of the members of this unit. If19
the policy decision unit of a country consists only of non-democratically
elected responsible policy maker i.e. a dictator, the preference function
for quantitative optimal plsnning will be the same as the individual pre-
ference function of this dictator and thus the aggregation problem refer-
red to above does not exist. However, if the policy decision unit consists
of one or more democratically accountable policy maker(s), somehow repre-
senting different interests among all the members of a country, carrying
out quantitative optimal planning in such a democracy will require the
establishment of a preference function somehow related to and derived from
the individual preference functions of the individual policy makers. In
this case we are dealing with the aggregation problem consisting in aggre-
gating the individual preference functions to the 'collective' preference
function, taking into account certain conditions of rational collective
and individual decision making by the policy decision making unit that
have to be satisfied and finally using the 'collective' p.f. for optimal
planning.
For a brief and concise analysis of the most important problem that arises
in the aggregation procedure i.e. the well-known 'Kenneth Arrow paradox'.
we shall assume a policy decision making unit to consist of three democra-
tically elected responsible policy makers representing three groups that
are rather homogenous with respect to preference orderings about the pos-
sible states of the economy of a democratically governed country. In this
way we can avoid the question of the links between the three policy makers
and the other individual members of the country.
Par. I.A.5.2. The Kenneth Arrow paradox
The rational possibility of aggregating individual preference functions
into 'collective' ones has been questioned by Arrow.il) Considering our
scheme of quantitative economic planning (I.a), Arrow argues that at the
moment of establishing a preference function the experts involved do not
exactly know the set A of feasible actions of the policy decision making
unit in the economy, and that besides the relation between the actions and
the resulting states of the economy i.e. s- f(a) is still unknown.20
In this case it will be necessary to establish a preference function which
allows a wide variety of possible individuel preference orderings over a
wide variety of possible states of the economy i.e. we have to take into
account a wide variety of possible individual preference functions aggre-
gating them into the 'collective' preference function. Arrow concludes
that there is no preference function which simultaneously satisfies all
the conditions of rational collective and individual decision making. At
least it will never simultaneously satisfy the following four well-known
conditions:
(1) The condition on the Pareto principle;
(2) The condition of non-dictatorship;
(3) The domain condition;
(4) The condition of independence of irrelevant alternative states of the
economy.
In the literature, condition (4) is generally indicated as being the con-
dition one must ignore if one wishes to overcome the problem of the Arrow
paradox. Coleman demonstrates how condition (4) may cause the Arrow para-
dox in s situation in which there are three policy makers and three alter-
native states of the economy.12)
Let us imagine the preference rankings given by the policy makers are:












In addition, we assume that the policymakers accept the idea of majority
voting in order to come to decisions.21
Now looking at diagram I.A.5.2 we may derive that i f we eliminate alterna-
tive s"', s' is preferred by the policymakers No. 1 and No. 3. In this
case alternative s' wins and the collective preference function generates
a collective preference ordering in the sense that s' wins over s" i.e.
s' ) s" .
Eliminating alternative state s ", s"' is preferred to s' by the policy-
makers No. 2 and No. 3 and therefore s"' wins over s' i.e. s"') s'.
If alternative state s' is eliminated, s" is preferred by the policy
makers No. 1 and No. 2 and therefore s" wins over s"' i.e. s") s"'.
Reviewing the three cases of eliminating respectively s"', s" and s' we
get:
e) s' ~ s"
b) s"' ~ s'
c) s" ~ s"' .
From a) and b) follows: s"' ~ s' ) s" . However, c) denotes s" ~ s" '
and from this we must conclude that this is a case of inconsistent collec-
tive preference ordering because the condition of independence of irrele-
vant alternative states of the economy is not satisfied. In the situation
described above the other three conditions (1), (2) and (3) are satisfied:
1. Starting from the majority voting procedure in which a state s' would
be preferred to another state s" according to all the three individual
preference rankings of the policy-makers, the same state s' would be
also preferred to s" according to the collective preference rank orde-
ring i.e. the condition of the Pareto principle is satisfied.
2. We found for each policy maker a situation in which strict preference
on his part was overruled by the collective preference ordering (by
means of majority voting), i.e. the condition of non-dictatorship is
satisfied.
3. The given orderings in diagram I.A.5.2 on the set of possible states of
the economy are logically possible orderings i.e. the domain condition
is satisfied.22
Par. I.A.5.3. Bypassing or overcoming the Kenneth Arrow paradox
In principle there are three possible ways to bypasa or to overcome the
impossibility theorem of Kenneth Arrow:
1. One may acknowledge its existence but assume this Arrow problem is
somehow resolved before the economist enters the scene.
2. One may attack the theorem and deny it because one of the conditions
referred to in I.A.5.2 (1), (2), (3) and (4) might actually themselves
be inconsistent with rationality in collective as well as individual
decision making.
3. One may acknowledge the theorem but question how far one can seriously
weaken, in one way or another, the conditions of the Arrow theorem with
regard to the practical use of the preference function to be esta-
blished in the institutional framework of actual economic planning.
The first possibility is used by applied economists like van Eyk and San-
dee who in their s priori approach use a linear preference function of the
policy decision-unit without discussing any possibly existing difficulties
concerning the relation between this 'collective' preference function and
the individual one of each member of the unit (see paragraph I.A.6).13)
This same possibility is used by those who try arrive at numerically known
preference functions by means of the implicit determination methods ap-
plied in the ex post approach e.g. Somermeyer and Nijkamp.14) When we
demonstrated our own determination method in the past we also assumed an a
priori known mathematical form of the preference function and we accepted
the idea that it does not seem unreasonable to assume 'ex post' that the
policy decision making unit of a country based its past decisions on some
set of preferences. Ex post one sould be able to define a preference func-
tion representing the preferences of the policy decision making unit, no
matter in which way they were related to the individusl preferences of the
policy makers.15) The eventual lack of exact knowledge as to how to derive
the preference function directly from the individual ones is (then) not
important anymore. Ex post we are able to observe the actions taken and
the resulting states of the economy caused by these actions. This means23
that the members of the policy decision unit actually arrive at a compro-
mise for decision making. Postulating a certain institutional framework of
quantitative optimal planning, for instance that of scheme (I.a), this
enabled us to derive the results of the compromise of numerically known
parameters of an a priori mathematically specified preference function.
Thus we got an indicator function denoting retrospectively the various
preferences finally settled on by the policy decision making group on
economic states.
The line of thought in the ex post approach is not permitted in the a
priori approach. In the latter approach we are faced with a situation in
which a compromise for decision making on actions and possible states of
the economy between the policy makers have not yet been reached, actions
have not yet been taken. In order to find out whether it may be possible
or not to arrive, in the future, at a compromise for decision making be-
tween the different policy makers, we have to interview each member of the
policy decision making unit with regard to their preference orderings on
possible actions to be taken and on the resulting states of the economy.
In this way one may derive their individusl preference functions; if one
wants to derive a preference function to be used for quantitative optimal
planning by the whole group of the policy decision making unit, sn aggre-
gation-method is required which involves the procedure generally accepted
by the policy makers to arrive at a compromise. Thus we face again the
Arrow problem.
The second possible method of overcoming the Kenneth Arrow paradox has
been used, among others by Coleman. He suggests that the Arrow approach to
the derivation of a preference function leaves out of consideration things
which are extremely important in the empirical cases of collective choice
and that it is this ommission which makes some authors accept the Arrow
paradox. This paradox would only be relevant to those collective choice
mechanisms in which it is not possible to express relative intensities of
preferences on possible states of the economy. But when it is possible to
express such intensities, the condition of independence of irrelevant
alternatives (condition (4) in I.A.5.1) is inconsistent with 'collective
rationality' as well as with 'individual rationality' in decision making.24
Coleman tries to show that when the outcome of this decision making is
uncertain (i.e. decision-making under risk) each individual policy maker
attaches to each possible outcome a subjective probability and thus at-
taches to the decision an expected utility. If he has various kinds of
behaviour he can carry out, he will act in such a way as to maximize the
expected utility and may imply that the original preference orderings of
the individual policy makers and so the collective preference orderings
are changed. In this sense the three results from eliminating respectively
the three alternative economic states in the example of I.A.5.2, discus-
sing there how the condition of independence of irrelevant alternative
states (condition (4)) may cause the Arrow paradox, may now be considered
to be consistent with collective and individual rationality in decision
making.
Johansen is one of those who use method 3 to overcome the Arrow para-
dox.i6j He tries to find a reasonable procedure for establishing a collec-
tive preference function only from individual preference ordering func-
tions.
He does not deny that intensities of preferences influence individual
behaviour of the policy maker (see: Coleman). However, no convincing
method has been devised to measure and compare, in a relevant way,
strength of preferences on the part of one individual policy maker, as
regards various pairs of alternative states of the economy and certainly
not as concerns comparing the preference intensities of the different
policy makers.
Thus by only confining his considerations to orderings concerning the
domain as well as the range of the preference function to be established,
he must accept the Arrow paradox. Trying to overcome this paradox he re-
commends to weaken the conditions of the Arrow theorem somewhat and to see
how far this will detract from the practical use of the established prefe-
rence function (only satisfying weakened conditions) in the real world of
quantitative optimal planning. If the reality of national economic plan-
ning may be described as we did in scheme (I.a), Johansen concludes that
in this case probably the condition of independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives can be given up wíthout too many serious consequences. If in scheme(I.a) the relation s- f(a), and the set A and the set 5 are known, indi-
cating which alternatives are relevant at a certain moment, then we can
obtain a preference ordering over the set of relevant alternatives St from
which we have to choose.
In this way we are not going to use the implied orderings on other sets
than St itself and so condition (4) of I.A.5.2 does not play a part any-
more.
Establishing first the set of feasible states St and only then, by means
of the information about St, establishing the preference function of the
policy decision unit, produces a'reasonable' possibility of applying the
optimization procedure to the economic planning of existing national eco-
nomies. Of course it will be very important that the models of such natio-
nal economies which delineate the set At of feasible actions and so the
set of feasible alternative states St by relation s- f(a) in scheme
(I.a), are very seriously established for each national economy (see also
relations (I.c) and (I.A.2.a)).
If this is not done, there is a risk of establishing a preference function
which is not quite valid for an actual situation in which we have to take
optimal decisions deriving them by maximizing this preference function
subject to the constraints. Applying the optimization procedure to the
wrong preference function and the wrong economic model results in deci-
sions on actions and desired states of the economy which are not optimal.
Par. I.A.6. The A Priori Approach
The a priori approach with regard to numerical determination of the prefe-
rence function of the policy decision unit is characterized by the line of
thought that such a determination may be possible before the point of time
at which actual decisions about economic planning have been taken.
Establishing the a priori numerically known preference function is rea-
lized by using the explicit determination method.
Par. I.A.6.1. The Explicit Determination Method
Using this method one specifies a priori the mathematical form of the
preference function (see for instance wt of I.A.2.2.a). Numerical values26
of the as yet unknown parameters of the preference function are derived
from data which are obtained by using interview techniques. Interviewing
the different policy makers will produce an insight into their different
individual marginal preference orderings on, and into the marginal rates
of substitution between, all the valued arguments of the individual prefe-
rence functions (i.e. sll the valued targets either with or without all
the valued instruments).
Par. I.A.6.2. Application of the explicit determination method
The literature on the determination of preference functions by means of
the explicit determination method provides many illustrative examples
although they have never left the stage of laboratory experimentation. We
shall mention three of them.
Frisch tried to establish a preference function by systematically inter-
viewing 'one' responsible politician.l~) This interview consisted in put-
ting to the policy maker distribution questions i.e. requesting from him a
desirable distribution of a given sum over a number of items of the natio-
nal economy. These interview data delineating the preference atructure of
the "dictator" were finally translated into a suitable form for the quan-
titative optimal planning technique in such a dictatorially governed coun-
try i.e. the construction of a quadratic preference function.
Another example can be found with Theil.
He assumes that there exists a group of 'n' policy decision makers which
decides for itself that decisions on a certain action (see scheme (I.a))
should be taken on the basis of 'collective' preferences; the latter
should be a sort of aggregate or compromise of their individual preferen-
ces. In order to arrive at optimal 'committee' decisions by means of quan-
titative optimization techniques a'collective' preference function is
established and is used as an agreement in the 'committee' of policy deci-
sion makers to adopt a formalized procedure of making compromises. In
analyzing this situation Theil uses the 'symmetry approach'.27
By first constructing quadratic individual preference functions one is
able to derive from the latter the 'loss functions' for all the members of
the committee.
These individual loss functions indicate the losses inflicted on each
member if a certain state of the economy is realised rather than the most
preferred state for each of them.
(Here, too, the numerical values of the parameters are derived from inter-
view data.)
Aggregation of the individual loss-functions into the 'collective' loss-
function occurs by constructing a linear combination of the individual
loss-functions.
In this linear combination each individual loss-function has been multi-
plied by an as-yet unknown coefficient indicating the weight to be at-
tached to the loss inflicted on any individual member of the committee if
one of the alternative states of the economy is realized rather than the
individually most preferred state.
Numerical determination of the weights by trying to get complete symmetry
(or a'best-approximation' of it) between the treatment of all the indivi-
dual members of the committee in the collective loss-function, finally
results in the numerically known quadratic collective loss-function to be
used for optimal 'committee' decision making.
As a last example of establishing a numerically known preference function
we shall mention again the attempt by van Eyk and Sandee.
They developed a linear preference function by setting up a priori the
linear form of this function with as only arguments the target variables.
They avoid any discussion of the possibly existing difficulties in deri-
ving the linear preference function from the individual preference func-
tions of policy-makers (see also I.A.5.3).
By examining the marginal rates of substitution for all the target vari-
ables, derived from 'imaginary' interview data, they work out the as-yet
unknown numerical values of the parameters of the linear preference func-
tion.
Many of such preference functions are distinguished as appropriate to
different situations in which a national economy can find itself. An ex-
ample has been given in the form of an experiment in finding an optimum28
policy by the government and the social and economic council ("SER") of
the Netherlands in 1957 taking into account the main targets and instru-
ments of economic policy in this country during that year.
The optimum policy had to be found by maximizing the numerically known
linear preference function, derived by means of the described explicit
determination method subject to the constraints of the Dutch economy. For
this optimization problem a linear programming technique was used. A
graphical presentation of a similar optimization problem has been set out
in an article by de Wolff and Sandee. Although they do not work explicitly
with a formalized preference function, they show how the Social and Econo-
mic Council in 1958 found an optimum policy with regard to s reduction of
the existing subsidies on milk consumption and an increase in controlled
rents, within the framework of an acceptable development of wages and
prices.18~
Par. I.A.6.3. Evaluation of the A Priori Approach
Evaluating the applications of the explicit determination method to nume-
rical determination of preference functions discussed in I.A.6.2 may give
us a clearer answer to the question as to how precisely the 'a priori'
approach is able to make a real, practical contribution to the possibility
of arriving ultimately at quantitative optimal management of national
economies i.e. the question how far experts are able to derive practically
usable preference functions emphasizing the a priori approach.
Frisch's quadratic preference function of one responsible policy maker can
in principle only be used for economic planning in dictatorially governed
countries. Besides, this preference function is based on interview data
which are the result of raising different questions about the distribution
of some sum, whereas on the other hand the items of the national economy
can hardly be influenced by the dictator interviewed only. He will always
need to the co-operation of the general public so as to arrive finally at
the optimal values of those items.
However, in spite of these two disadvantages there also is an advantage:29
in Frisch's case there is no problem with the Kenneth Arrow paradox be-
cause real aggregation of different individual preference functions into e
collective one is not required.
Theil's method of establishing a preference function by aggregating the
individual preference functions of the various members of a national poli-
cy decision unit, and using his 'symmetry'-approach, can be regarded as
being a'second best' solution to the Kenneth Arrow problem.
Only in those real situstions in which the condition of independence of
irrelevant alternative states of the economy can be disregarded his line
of thought is allowed; i.e. referring to our scheme of the system of eco-
nomic planning (I.a), only in those situations in which the relevant al-
ternative states of the economy are known before establishing the prefe-
rence function can his method produce useful different preference func-
tions, each of them only being available for the known different possible
economic situations. His method does not allow derivation of a definitive
preference function in the Arrow sense i.e. the derivation of a preference
function available in all possible economic-political situations and al-
lowing a wide variety of possible individual preference-orderings on a
wide variety of possible states of the economy. Here the expression 'pos-
sible' is used in order to denote the two sets of all, relevant and irre-
levant possibilities of the individual preference orderings and of the
states of the economy in any realistic situation respectively.
For any realistic situation, delineated by the available economic model
(see scheme (I.a)) a realistic preference function has to be established
over and again.
Although this line of action can be adopted theoretically in order to
arrive finally at optimal policy management in a democracy by means of
quantitative optimization procedures, there are doubts about its practical
applicability. Establishing over and again a realistic preference function
always requires an enormous amount of up-to-date information on the part
of the policy makers.
To get this information in the short term and so in time by interviewing
the policy makers over and over again is a precarious matter. Besides,
there is another important difficulty: all members of the policy decision
making unit in a democracy will not always reveal exactly and~or honestlytheir various preferences about economic-political states during the in-
terview. In this case establishing the preference function by using
Theil's approach will result in numerically-known parameter values devi-
ating from the reaslistic or 'optimal' ones.
Maximizing such a function subject to the constraints probably yields non-
optimal solutions such as we got in the situation of non-seriously esta-
blished economic models delineating the constraints of the economy (see
par. I.A.5)
The non-optimal solutions consisting of non-optimal decisions could create
conflicts between the members of the policy making group and thus a prefe-
rence function which because those non-optimal solutions cannot be accep-
ted.
The application of the explicit determination method by Van Eyk and Sandee
shows the same difficulties with regard to obtaining exact information in
time, information about individual preference orderings on states of the
economy and actions to be taken, as we saw with Theil if one uses data
resulting from genuine interviewing instead of the data used by Van Eyk
and Sandee resulting from 'imaginary' interviewing of the policy makers.
Besides they deliberately avoid a serious discussion of the possible exis-
tence of the Arrow paradox and the aggregation techniques to be used in
order to establish finally the preference function based on the enormous
amount of information on the part of the individual policy makers.
Summing up we can say that the efforts discussed of numerically determi-
ning a preference function within the train of thought of the a priori
approach, were in the first place experiments in analyzing the theoretical
questions and difficulties which arise if we want to get a perference
function before actual policy management is performed. In practice the a
priori approach did not contribute much to the reel applicability of quan-
titative policy management. Problems such as the Arrow paradox, the inter-
view- and aggregation techniques to be used, the wide diversity of prefe-
rences within one policy decision making unit and so on, do not only ob-
viate a once-and-for-all determination of the preference function but also
prevent a preference function from being determined for a certain realis-
tic economic-political situation, from being operational in time to per-
form actual policy management.31
Because of this circumstance some authors abondoned the a priori approach
and tried to find better solutions to the problem of determining a useful
preference function. They emphasize the ex post approach as we shall do in
order to find a determination method for so-called implicit preference
functions.
Par. Z.A.7. The Ex Post Approach
In this spproach one assumes that the policy decision making unit of a
country was guided in the past by preferences on actions to be taken and
on the resulting states of the economy caused by these actions during the
decision processes.
Starting from this assumption, one tries to arrive at numerically-known
preference functions to be determined after the points of time at which
the decisions were actually taken and the resulting realised states of the
economy are known. This kind of information can be obtained by opserving
the realised values of all the economic variables; among them the values
of the target- and instrument variables y and z in scheme (I.a) are of
particular interest because they are considered to be the arguments of the
preference function to be derived (see I.b).
The ex post numerically-derived preference function will, in the first
place serve an 'indicator function' indicating on which preference struc-
ture of the policy decision making unit optimal decisions were taken, and
thus which optimal economic-political situations were realised, the latter
of which are assumed to have become known by means of observation. Esta-
blishment of the ex post numerically known preference function is realised
by using the implicit determination method. The preference function nume-
rically-determined by means of this method is often called the 'Implicit
Preference Function', because in this case the preference structure with
regard to actions and states of the economy is derived implicitly without
making use of interview- and aggregation techniques.32
Par. I.A.7.1. The Implicit Determination Method
Using this method for the derivation of numerically-known preference func-
tions, one accepts the idea of virtual quantitative optimal economic plan-
ning by the policy decision making unit of a country which is performed by
maximizing a preference function of (I.b) subject to the side conditions
of the economy of such a country (see f.i. (I.c)).
The optimization procedure is supposed to be performed by means of a quan-
titative optimization technique.
What optimization technique is actually used depends on the way in which
the preference function and the side conditions are mathematically formu-
lated.
If one obtains ex post all (approximated) information desired about:
1. The mathematical form and contents of the preference functions to be
maximized;
2. the structural form of the side conditions of the economy;
3. the optimization technique applied in the optimization process, and
4. the realized optimal values of the economic-political variables, it may
be possible to determine the numerical values of the as yet unknown
parameters of the preference function implying that the realized values
of the economic-political variables in the preference function i.e.
those of the targets and instruments of the policy decision making unit
are indeed optimal.
In the ex post approach using the implicit determination method, the above
desired information is assumed to be available because:
1.1. the mathematical function can be (un)specified a priori
2.1. the structural form of the side conditions of the economy ("the eco-
nometric model") can be derived by standard econometric determination
techniques or is known by a priori knowledge.
3.1. From 1.1 and 2.1 it will be clear which optimization technique may be
assumed as having been used by the policy decision making unit for
the quantitative optimization procedure which consists in maximizing
the (approximated) preference function subject to the constraints of
the econometric model.33
4.1. One assumes that the decisions on values of the target- and instru-
ment vectors (~ and z in (I.a)) corresponded exactly to the preferen-
ces of the policy decision making unit which implies that the known
realised values of these vectors, obtained by empirical observation
may be considered as being optímal.
From 1.~4. and 1.1~4.1 we can derive the conclusion that the implicit
determination problem with regard to preference functions may be consi-
dered to be the inverted case of the quantitative economic planning pro-
blem ( see scheme I.a).The quantitative economic planning-problem consists
of maximizing p.f.
~t - W(yt, Zt)
subject to
ft(yt' ~t' ? t' Xt' yt-p' ~t-p) - 0
(Z.A.7.l.a)
(I.A.7.l.b)
which finally results in the optimal values of the elements of the target-
and instrument variable vectors using an appropriate quantitative optimi-
zation technique.
With the implicit determination problem we are considering a number of
observations of all the economic variables in (I.A.7.l.a) and (I.A.7.l.b)
among which those of the targets and instruments are of particular inte-
rest. Their observed values are considered to be optimal. Specifying or
not the a priori (approximated) mathematical form and contents of p.f.
(I.A.7.l.a) one has to derive the as-yet unknown parameters of this (ap-
proximated) preference function to be maximized, taking into account of
the known structural form of the side conditions in (I.A.7.l.b).
Par. I.A.7.2. Applications of the Implicit Determination Method
Up to now a lot of applications of the ex post approach with regard to
numerical derivation of preference functions by means of the implicit
determination method are known.l9)34
Somermeyer emphasized the ex post approach and suggested the implicít
determination method as being the right method for detecting the as yet
undetermined numerical values of the parameters of a given preference
function of specified form and contents for the Common Market.20)
Knowledge of the existing side conditions within the Common Market will
make it possible taking into account also the tariffs agreed upon at the
Treaty of Rome (1956) as variables in his Common Market Model, to deter-
mine those as yet indeterminate numerical values of the parameters of the
a priori mathematically specified preference function which will be con-
sistent with the results of the maximization procedure with regard to the
preference function subject to the side conditions. Ultimately, they could
be found, using the implicit determination method.
The numerically known preference function obtained indicates the weights
to be attached to its different variables implying that the agreed deci-
sions on:
1. the possible abolition of all tariffs on trade flows between the member
countries, and
2. the adoption of certain uniform tariffs by all member countries on
imports from third countries were optimal.
The suggestion that the policy decision unit of the Common Market possibly
had too little understanding of the full implications of the decisions
agreed upon will let unhindered that the analysis of the weights deter-
mined of the different variables of the preference function allows for
finding out whether these weights were the intended ones in 1956 or not.
If they were not, it would be possible to analyze which tariff-changes are
desired so as to arrive finally at the desired optimal situation.
Different applications of the implicit determination method to realistic
economic political situations can be found in an important paper written
by Nijkamp.21)
He adopts a deterministic as well as a stochastic approach in order to
determine, or to estimate, the numerical values of the parameters of the
preference function, by means of the implicit determination method.
Listing first some reasons why other attempts of applying the implicit
determination method by authors as G.L. Reuber, W. Dewald and H. Johnson35
and J. Wood22) were not satisfactory or even negative, Nijkamp starts out
by setting up his deterministic static model for numerical determination
of the parameters of the preference function. In this case he disregards
stochastic aspects and only assumes preference functions which bear on a
planning horizon of one time period (year).
An application of this deterministic static determination model to the
economic political situation in the U.S.A, for the year 1933 is given. The
side conditions are provided by Klein's Model I, being a simplified des-
cription of the American economy during the years 1921-1941. Because this
first example is illustrative of Nijkamp's line of thought we shall brief-
ly review the steps to be taken so as to arrive finally at his determinis-
tic static implicit determination model for preference functions. Besides
it makes it possible to compare the model with the ones we have developed
and restated in the next section as well as in the past.
Following the line of thought of Theil and others he sets up a priori a
quadratic preference function:
N A N M
~t - bt yt f ct zt t~yt Pyt `~izt Q?t (I.A.7.2.e)
which is replaced (in order to get a clearer insight into the implicit
determination problem) by a simplified version given in (I.A.2.2.a) i.e.
M M
"t - ~yt Pxt } ~?t ~Lt (I.A.7.2.a')
Preference function ~t of (I.A.7.2.a') has to be maximized subject to the
linear constraints described by the linear model of (I.A.2.a) or its re-
duced form of (I.A.2.l.a) i.e.
,yt - Szt t Tut (I.A.7.2.b)
Using the classical solution technique for this optimization problem one
can get an optimal policy instrument-vector like that of (I.A.2.2.b) i.e.
~ -1 ~
zt --[Q t S PS] S PTut (I.A.7.2.c)36
M
([Q t S PS] is negative ( semi) definite)
The optimal solution system of the flexible target policy of (I.A.7.2.c)
i s the basic starting point of the last major steps to be taken in order
to arrive at Nijkamp's determination model.
In this case all the coefficients of system (I.A.~.2.c) are known except
for those of the diagonal matrices P and Q ( the elements of which are the
as yet unknown parameters of preference function (I.A.~.2.s'). Besides zt
and ut are known from observations relating to one year.
Let now us see which steps remain to be taken.
Applying certain standard matrix operations on system (I.A.~.2.c) results
in the following linear and homogenous system of equations:
[Ik Nt].[~t] - 0 (I.A.7.2.d)
where: [Ik Nt] is a K X(KtJ) matrix
Ik is the K x K unity matrix
w -
Nt - zt1S (vt t wt) is a K x J matrix
where- ztl -is the normal inverse of a diagonal matrix of order K
with the elements of the K x 1 instrument-vector zt on the main
diagonal.
vt and wt are the diagonal matrices with the elements of the J x 1




yt and ~t are the (Kxl) and (JX1) vectors respectively of the unknown
parameters of the instrument and target variables in preference function
~t of (I.A.7.2.a').
o is the K X 1 null-vector.
Because the rank of matrix [Ik Nt] of the homogenous system of (I.A.~.2.d)
equals K, there are K}J-K - J degrees of freedom.37
From the infinite set of possible non-trivial solutions for system
(I.A.7.2.d) one may derive (K}i) elements setting (Kti) times J-1 elements
9
of the vector [~t] equal to zero and 1 element (the basic element) equal
t
to one. In this way the a priori mathematicaïly specified preference func-
tion (I.A.7.2.a') can be numerically specified encompassing only Ktl para-
meters (and thus Ktl variables) instead of the original K4J parameters.
Therefore, in this case one spesks of a partial function instead of an
overall-preference function.
Only if it is assumed that preference function (I.A.7.2.a') contains K
instruments and one target, the Ktl parameters of such an overall function
bearing on a horizon of only one period (year) can be determined in a
unique way up to an arbitrary factor (i.e. basic element - 1).
This is possible because the preference function of (I.A.7.2.a') is inva-
riant against a monotonously increasing transformation, and therefore
attributing a value to the remaining basic element, setting it equal to
one, is possible without any loss of generality.
Let us return to system (I.A.7.2.d) from which one may derive:
[Zk Nt].[~~]k - ct (I.A.7.2.e)
where Nt represents Nt without the first column, while pt denotes the
vector pt without its first element.
The vector ct is extracted from the first column of Nt multiplying its
elements by minus the value of the first element of et, setting it arbi-
trarily equal to 1.
If J-1 elements of the vector [~t] in system (I.A.7.2.e) are set equal to
t
zero we get:
[I Nt].[~t] - Cct] ( I.A.7.2.f)
t -38
where: [I Nt] represents matrix [I Nt] in system (I.A.~.2.e) without those
~t columns corresponding to the J-1 elements of the vector [] which
~t
are set equal to zero.
[~t] represents the vector [~t] without the J-1 elements which are
~t ~t
set equal to zero plus 1 element set equal to one.
In order to et the
KtJ
g (Kfl)
possible solutions mentioned above we have to
solve a system as (I.A.~.2.f).
From (I.A.~.2.f) we derive the solution vector (if the first element of pt
of system (Z.A.~.2.d) is taken as basic element) as follows:
[~t] - [I Nt]-1.[ct]
t
(I.A.~.2.g)
in which: [I Nt]-1 represents the normal inverse of the non-singular (KxK)
matrix [I Nt] of system (I.A.~.2.f).
Correspondin to the
KtJ
g (Ktl) solutions to be obtained in a similar way as
denoted in (I.A.7.2.g), we may derive numerically a similar number of
partial preference functions replacing the elements of the diagonal matri-
ces P and Q of p.f. ( I.A.~.2.a') by their numerically-known values.
Par. I.A.~.3. Evaluation of the Ex Post Approach
Evaluating the line of thought of the ex post approach in which one makes
use of the implicit determination method to determine numerically-known
preference functions and comparing its advantages and disadvantages with
those of the explicit determination method to be used in the a priori
approach, we come to the conclusion that one should prefer the ex post
approach to the a priori one.
Various reasons can be given. In I.A.5.3 we already set out why the ex
post situation enables us to avoid Arrow problems and other questions
about aggregation of individual preference functions into 'collective'
ones. Moreover, other advantages can be mentioned in favour of the impli-39
cit determination method. By making use of observed values of the diffe-
rent economic variables (see I.A.~.1 and I.A.~.2), the numerically deter-
mined implicit preference function is based on more 'objective' informa-
tion than the explicit preference function of which the numerical values
of the parameters are based on 'subjective' interview data.
For reasons mentioned in I.A.6.3 such as the possibility that inexact
and~or dishonest information is given by the individual policy makers
during the interviews, the explicitly derived individual preference func-
tions will often deviate from the 'realistic' preference structures of the
individusl policy-makers and because of this the same can be said about
the collective preference function of the policy decision making unit to
be established by aggregation of the individual preference functions.
Another advantage of the implicit determination method to be used in the
ex post approach consists in the circumstance that one only needs that
information (i.e. observed values of the economic variables) which is in
many cases already known to be used for other purposes in a national eco-
nomy. Because 'interviewing' of the policy-makers is not required in the
implicit determination method, one needs far less time for collecting and
processing the desired information and because of this the implicit deter-
mination process of numerically-known preference functions proceeds
quicker than the explicit one of the a priori approach.
All this contributes to making the preference function established by
means of the implicit determination method more 'reliable' and more 'up to
date'. It may give a far better insight into the preference structure of
a policy decision making unit than we can obtain when using the explicit
determination method of the ex post approach.
The more 'reliable' and 'up to date', the more appropriate such a prefe-
rence function will be for use as an objective function for quantitative
optimal economic planning.
However, also in the ex post approach using the implicit determination
method, various theoretical and practical problems are to be solved (some
of which appearing in the explicit determination method of the a priori
approach too), and which we shall discuss below.
In both approaches and the foregoing examples one specifies a priori the
mathematical form of the preference function.40
Such an a priori specification of the mathematical form (and contents) of
the preference function to be determined numerically has to satisfy condi-
tions of mathematical tractability and of theoretical economic-political
consistency.
Mathematical tractability of the preference function has to do with the
question whether it is appropriate or not for such a preference function
to undergo the necessary mathematical standard operations belonging to a
certain mathematical optimization technique to be used for solving the
existing quantitative optimal economic planning. The requirement of theo-
retical economic-political consistency means that for a preference func-
tion to be used as objective function for quantitative optimal economic
planning, it must only obey properties which are consistent with real
thinking on optimal economic planning by the policy decision making unit
i.e. it has to correspond in a unique way to the existing preference
structure of this unit.
Let us first discuss the condition of mathematical tractability of the
preference function.
The policy making unit dealing with quantitative economic planning is
assumed to make use of one of the known classical, Lagrangean optimiza-
tion- or mathematical programming techniques.
Literature on mathematical optimization techniques indicates which one has
to be applied, depending on the different situations in which one has to
maximize or minimize an objective function subject to certain side condi-
tions.23) In other words, the mathematical optimization technique to be
used is determined by the mathematical forms of the objective function and
the mathematically formulated side-conditions. Besides the length of the
period over which one has to optimize will play a part with regard to the
technique to be chosen.
If for a certain optimization problem an appropriate mathematical solu-
tion-technique can be found, the objective function and the side-condi-
tions which together describe the important elements of the optimization
problem in mathematical terms, are said to be mathematically tractable.
However, if such an appropriate mathematical solution technique is not
available one may try to find the mathematically tractable situation by
changing the mathematical form of the objective function and~or of the41
side conditions together with or without the development of a new mathema-
tical solution technique.24) Of course the changed objective function
and~or side conditions must remain consistent with the original optimal
economic planning problem.
In order to satisfy the condition of mathematical tractability of the a
priori mathematically specified preference functions to be determined
numerically by using the implicit determination method one is ultimately
faced with the following problem:
Try to find such an a priori mathematical form of the preference function
c~t of (I.A.~.l.a) as would make it possible to calculate the optimal va-
lues of its arguments (i.e. the observed values of xt and zt) by maximi-
zing this preference function subject to the structural form of the side
conditions in (I.A.~.l.b) using one of the existing mathematical optimiza-
tion techniques, if the numerical values of the parameters of preference
function wt had been known.
If such a priori mathematical form cannot be found one should try it again
after a permitted modification of the known structural form of the side
conditions and~or the development of a new mathematical optimization tech-
nique.
Together with the conditions of mathematical tractability the a priori
mathematically specified form of the preference function has to satisfy
conditions of economic-political consistency i.e. the a priori form of the
preference function and besides its contents (the arguments) have to be
consistent with the realistic preference structure of the economic policy
decision unit.
In the literature on preference functions many different mathematical
forms of these (or approximations of them) are suggested of which the
three most important ones are the linear, the log-linear and the quadratic
forms of c~t in (I.A.7.l.a) depending on the assumptions, made by the va-
rious authors, concerning the preferences of the policy makers with regard
to possible combinations of the real-valued arguments of ~t. Starting from
a certain mathematical form two basic notions are often used to indicate
the properties to be assumed with regard to the preference structure of
the policy decision making unit i.e. those of the marginal preferences of42
the various arguments of the preference function and those of the marginal
rates of substitution of any pair of these arguments.
The marginal preferences are obtained by taking the first derivatives of
c~t with respect to its various arguments, whereas the marginal rates of
substitution may be derived by taking the ratio of any pair of marginal
preferences. The linear preference function will produce constant marginal
preferences as well as marginal rates of substitution, whereas the latter
two will not be constant but decreasing in the cases in which we are dea-
ling with log-linear or quadratic preference functions.
As concerns the contents of the a priori preference function there are
suthors who suggest that only the target-variables xt have to be taken as
arguments of Wt whereas others also want to introduce all the instrument
variables zt as arguments of this function. The latter authors believe
that the members of a policy decision making unit base their decisions not
only on preferences about the possible combinations of real-valued target
variables but also about the possible combinations of real-valued policy
instruments to reach the targets. This will become clearer when we realize
that the individual members of the policy decision making unit are not
only maximizing social welfare in the sense that they only try to realize
optimal values of the economic target variables, but at the same time,
being after all politicians, they want to assure their own political sur-
vival depending on the political, social and ideological consequences of
the extent to which the economic policy instruments are used.
Thus one may accept the idea that policy makers will also have preferences
on the different possibilities (different combinations of real-valued
instruments) to reach the targets and as a matter of fact these preferen-
ces will ultimately exert their influence on the optimal target values to
be determined.
From what has been said so far, it will be clear that an a priori specifi-
cation of the mathematical form of the preference function can never be
unique because there exist many different mathematical forms; every one of
these may be realistic, mathematically tractable and consistent in diffe-
rent situations for which an optimum economic policy has to be determined
(a priori approach) or had to be determined (ex post approach).43
If in spite of this last consideration one wants (in the ex post approach,
using the implicit determination method) to determine numerically the
virtual preference structure (on which the policy decision making unit is
supposed to have based its decisions in the past, making use for each
observation period of realised optimal economic planning of the same a
priori specification of the mathematical form and contents of the prefe-
rence function), it will be desirable to set up such an a priori mathema-
tical shape which is rather universal i.e. which meets a priori require-
ments of mathematical tractability and economic-political consistency
available for any period (year) of the observation horizon.
We shall end this section by evaluating Nijkamp's application of his de-
terministic static implicit determination model of preference functions to
the economic-political situation in the U.S.A. for the year 1933 ( see also
(I.A.~.2)).
His first effort resulted in a set of fifteen alternative partial prefe-
rence functions. Nijkamp himself already had to conclude that the resul-
ting parameter values corresponding to the different alternatives of the
contents of these partial preference functions were still unsatisfactory,
especially because of the fact that parameters belonging to the same tar-
gets and instruments showed large variations in their values with regard
to the different alternatives. He indicates four points of explanation
i.e..
a. the a priori specification of the preference function ut in
(I.A.~.2.a') may have been too simple;
b. The results are very sensitive to even small variations in the obser-
vations for a single period;
c. dynamic elements may be overlooked;
d. there may have been some inconsistencies in American policy.
He tries to improve these unsatisfactory results by assuming the more
extended form of the overall preference function (I.A.~.2.a) and besides
he takes into account an observation horizon or more than one year. His
deterministic-static model becomes now a stochastic-static one. However,44
this line of action did not mean an improvement, a fact which was manifes-
ted in the large standard errors of estimation of the parameter values
especially with regard to the quadratic terms of ~t (I.A.~.2.a).
Only the fact that his stochastic-static implicit determination method
made possible a numerical derivation of an overall preference function in
which all the target- and instrument variables were included instead of
partial ones, stood forth as an improvement.
However, in this case one had to assume a priori that a preference func-
tion would remain the same during the whole observation horizon, or that
at least the marginal preferences of its different arguments would do so,
which seems to us less realistic than the assumption of a preference func-
tion changing in the course of an observation horizon of more than one
year. Nijkamp also saw his problem and therefore he considered a dynamic
preference function in his dynamic-stochastic analysis although an appli-
cation of the resulting dynamic-stochastic implicit determination model
has not been given.
We shall return to his deterministic-static implicit determination model
and sum up more fundamental shortcomings of this procedure, some of whích
are removed in the dynamic-stochastic analysis mentioned above i.e.:
1. Developing this deterministic-static implicit determination model (see
I.A.~.2) always requires an a priori quadratic specification of the
mathematical form of the preference function which is assumed to be
maximized subject to constraints of a linear and static econometric
model in order to get an analytical solution using the normal inverse
technique.
Although the combination of a quadratic preference function together
with a linear econometric model of itself may often be considered a
priori as giving an appropriate approximation of the functioning of and
of the relations between the various variables of a realistic economy
snd, in addition it may be mathematically tractable, we think that,
when using this combination as an important input for setting up a
determination model of implicit preference functions, already implies a
certain restriction of the analytical power of such a model with re-
spect to our sim of using it for the derivation of the best indicators45
of the preference structures on which the policy decison making unit
are assumed to have decided in the past.
Aiming at the best indicators requires the best information on which
their derivation has to be based. The more the results i.e. the numeri-
cally known indicator or implicit preference functions are sensitive to
deviations of the available information from the correct one, the more
one has to try to get this correct information.
In our case it means that one should look for an a priori specification
of the preference functions which may be less restrictive than those
e.g. of the quadratic kind. With respect to the constraints, i.e. the
econometric model whose structural form in the ex post approach was
supposed to be known a priori, one should, for instance, ask for non-
linear dynamic econometric models, especially because empirical evi-
dence has shown that models of this kind may often give a much better
description of the economic reality in quantitative terms.
Thus the combination of a less-restrictive preference function and a
more refined econometric model may often be an essential improvement of
the implicit determination model.
2. With regard to our knowledge about the circumstances under which econo-
mic policy was made in the past we may conclude that in almost all
countries the policy decision making units have planned for the short-
term.
Because of this we may only derive implicit preference functions which
are based on short-term observation horizons (e.g. one year). So in
fact we need short-term period analysis and short-term determination
models for implicit overall preference functions.
In Nijkamp's case the possibility of deriving this short-term implicit
'overall' preference function is an exception. As we saw in I.A.~.2
generally only partial preference functions could be numerically deter-
mined, setting up a number of elements of the set of unkown parameters
equal to zero.
This fact immediately raises the problem of the disappearance of quite
a few relationships before the ultimate numerical determination of the
remaining parameters of the preference function has taken place i.e.
those relations which correspond to the disappearing J-1 elements of46
~t the vector of unknown parameters [~ ] of system (I.A.7.2.e) will disap-
t
pear.
From this last circumstance, together with the fact that one uses dif-
ferent units of ineasurement it follows that the numerical determination
of the different partial preference functions takes place on the basis
of different kinds of input information and so this situation already
cuts short the possibility of comparing the different results.
3. Last but not least we shall mention another shortcoming of Nijkamp's
model referred to above, for the determined parameter values are only
influenced by the observed values cf the instruments zt and the data
ut. However, because the structural economic model has not been built
into the determination model into where zt is expressed in terms of the
other variables the observed values of the target variables do not play
a part anymore. Besides, if there are targets appearing only in the
linear part of the p.f., they are singled out by the maximization pro-
cedure and consequently they do not come back in the optimal instrument
vector system on which the determination model is based i.e. one or
more relations of the reduced form are singled out before having ob-
tained the optimal zt-vector.
Section I.B. Two alternative determinationmodels for preference structures
Par. I.B.1 The DSID-model for Relative Preference Elasticities
Foregoing section I.A. concerned theoretical and empirical investigations
on preference functions by different authors. Some of these investigations
were especially based on the a priori approach which did not convince all
experts of its practical value. Empirical workers preferred to use the ex
post approach seeming to be a better way to derive - in an objective way -
the preference structures of the policy decision unit.
Of course it is premature to claim in both approaches that the state of
the arts is already such that optimal policies could right away be based
on preference functions.
We accept the purely pragmatic argument that the concept of a macro prefe-
rence function should be introduced if it is useful, even if we know that
neither individuals nor societies are maximizing such a function. In this47
case the preference function must be viewed as an "ss-if" concept i.e. if
a preference function had been maximized at all what would have been its
characteristics.
We proved in earlier contributions that the exercise of determining impor-
tant characteristics of the implicit preference function can tell us some-
thing about relative preferences and their evolution over time. In our
train of thought these relative preference structures should be computed
ex post, the corresponding preference function being viewed as the result
of economic - political activity.
Instability in economic - political relations will show up in the instabi-
lity of the relative preferences. How these relative preferences are
measured and the problems that beset this measure was the main field of
our investigation.
We developed a determination model and used it for getting a valid know-
ledge about the evolution of implicit relative preference structures in
France, Belgium and the Netherlands.~5)
Application of our theoretical results to these situations implies the
measurement of the evolution of the ex post revealed preferences during a
certain number of years. They could be compared with the ex ante political
intentions in these countries and in this way one may deduce something
about the efficiency and consistency of economic-political activity there.
Looking again to scheme (I.a) and the functions (I.b) and (I.c) in the
foregoing section, our concern is with an ex post measure of c~(Y,z) or
more likely with measure of economic concepts as marginal preferences,
relative preferences, preference elasticities and relative preference
elasticities for which the mathematical formulations can be derived from
this function.
In section I.A. we indicated that an optimal quantitative economic policy
can be mathematically formulated as follows:
max ~
(y.?. t)
Y, z, e V(t) (I.B.l.a)
t
where V(t) - {y,z~(Y,z) e E , fn(Y,z,v,x,Y ,v ,e,t)-0;n-1,.. ,N}48
c~(~,z,t) is the preference function in year t, being a scalarvalued func-
tion, which is assumed to be continuously differentiable in the neighbour-
hood of the optimum.
The arguments x and z are the vectors of the target - resp. instrumental
variablea of economic policy, and are of order J resp. K defined in an
Euclidean space of corresponding orders; they are the sub-elements of the
argument-vector (y,z) of order JtK, defined in an J~K dimensional eucli-
dean space.
fn(y,z,v, x,Y ,v , e,t) are the constraints or the side conditions descri-
bing the structure of the economy concerned and are also assumed to be
continuously differentiable in the neighbourhood of the optimum. The
meaning of the other vectors has became clear already in the introduction
of the preceding section. Considering the optimisation problem of mathema-
tical programming of system (I.B.l.s) we can ask for a solution of the
next four problems:
a) Which are the functional forms and arguments contained in both the
preference function and the side model of system (I.B.l.a)?
b) If the econometric specification of the side model snd the mathematical
specification of the preference function are known, how can we derive
the numerical values of the parameters of the preference function7
c) Which are the important characteristics of the preference function and
how can they be measured in a numerical way?
d) What are the dynamic properties of these important characteristics viz.
what are the dynamic properties of entities like relative preferences
and relative preference elasticities, these being considered as indica-
tors of the dynamic properties of the implicit social preferences?
These four questions are concerned with the ex post approach of the opti-
mizing problem formulated in system (I.B.l.a) i.e., we suppose this pro-
blem has been solved in the past and the realised values of the vectors of
this system are known and can be observed for different years. Solution ofthe four problems ask for hypotheses as regards the optimation procedure
corresponding with (I.B.l.a).
In fact we are dealing with an inverted optimizing problem which can be
formalized as follows:
"Which are the specifications of the preference function and the side
conditions snd which was the corresponding mathematical programming
procedure compatible with the realised values of the vectors of the
target- and instrumental variables x and z being optimum values of
economic policy management performed in the past?"
Formalizing this inverse problem by means of a mathematical system of
equations and solution of this system will finally offer possibilities of
getting a better knowledge about implicit preference structures for an
economy in the past (i.e. ex post).
In section I.A. we made an evaluation of a few empirical applications of
this ex post approach. We saw a solution of the inverted optimisationpro-
blem resulting in the numerical derivation of an arbitrary implicit prefe-
rence function, the latter being a retrospective indicator function for
which the determination techniques could still be improved.
Confining ourselves for a while to the first two questions a) and b), an
improvement may consist of setting up a more general mathematical form of
the a priori specified preference function, having as arguments all pos-
sible target- and instrumental variables of an economy.
Of course the number and nature of the feasible target- and instrumental
variables will always depend on the side model specification.
Therefore another improvement can be the introduction of more realistic
alternative side models (often of the non-linear and dynamic kind).
Moreover, the quantitative values of the parameters to be found should be
influenced not only by the observed absolute values of the variables but
also by the economic structure itself and the development of this struc-
ture.
Finally we may ask for a determinationmodel that should admit the deriva-
tion of the "overall preference function" i.e. a preference function that
contains all the a priori target- and instrumental variables.
Numerical experiments based on an a priori specified "overall preference
function" can make it clear in how far the a priori considered variables50
of the preference function were relevant or not for optimum economic poli-
cy.
Results of investigations as regards the first two questions a) and b) of
which we also gave an account in the mentioned earlier studies, have shown
the possibillity to set up more generalized a priori - mathematical forms
of the preference function of which we could be convinced a priori that
the parameter values ultimately to be derived could have more meaning as
regards preference structures of the economy concerned.
In our apeciel case, created in the aforementioned contributions, we sug-
gested to use the a priori mathemstical specification of the Cobb-Douglas
type and even an unspecified functional form of the preference function
has been investigated. The parameters of the first function-type are pre-
ference elasticitiea, ss contrasted with the parameters of the a priori
quadratic specification of Nijkamp and others. However, in the beginning
we limited ourselves like these authors to e quadratic specification using
arguments connecting with problems of certainty-equivalence. Afterwards we
adheres the argument of an a priori more realistic meaning of the parame-
ters should be preferred to that of the certainty equivalence one. Besi-
des, the comparison of the results of our earlier study where we performed
numerical determinations based, among other things, on a partitioned qua-
dratic form of the preference function with those of our D.S.I.D. - model
for the Belgium situation shows the influence of differentiating the form
of the preference function. We shall report these results in the research
memorandum, forthcoming as 'An Exercise In Welfare Economies (IV)'. How-
ever, as long as we use a priori specified preference functions, the
aforementioned improvements included, one cannot avoid the circumstance
that all results will always be influenced by any a priori specification
of the preference function and of the side model of system (I.B.l.a). Size
and direction of this influence can be investigated using sensitivity
analysis applied to the resulting mathematical programming models as con-
cerns the optimisation problem (I.B.l.a) and its inverse.
The latter indicates how incorrect specification of the mathematical form
and contents of the preference function and of the side model are relevant
as regards the quantitative results.26) Although one could make an ulti-
mate choice to be based on a set of more or less arbitrary norms in order51
to get the "best-approximate" results, the aforementioned problem of in-
fluence remains as regards the search of solutions to the problems a) and
b).
Besides another big problem arises here viz. that of the second order
conditions to be satisfied by the quantitative results of the mathematical
programming problem (I.B.l.a) and its inverse.
Authors as Theil, Somermeyer and Nijkamp took great care in making sure
that the second order conditions would be satisfied. The latter achieved
this essentially by imposing conditions on the main diagonal of the Hes-
sian of his quadratic preference function after substitution in it of the
side conditions (see also section I.A.).
Quadratic programming was applied to ensure this result.
However it often happens that constraints of the side model do not have
such a simple structure as is supposed in most of the theoretical and
empirical investigations.
In these cases imposing second order constraints on the results may be
easy in a theoretical sense but in practice this difficulty is hard to
overcome. The problems mentioned of the inverted optimisation problem i.e.
those of the influence of incorrect specification and of the second order
conditions could be side-stepped if we are more interested in questiona c)
and d) .
For, apart from the question whether it is premature or not to claim that
the state of the arts is already such that optimal policies could right
away be based on preference functions, the specification of these func-
tions is always fraught with difficulties like those we discussed above.
So the best thing to do is to ask for a method to get a better knowledge
of the preference structure of an economy, whereas the difficulties, espe-
cially those in the methodological field, are minimised.
We hope to prove this study can deliver a new perspective to arrive at a
better compromise between the need of a better knowledge of social prefe-
rences on the one side, and methodological claims on the other one. If we
turn our special attention to the questiona c) and d) it becomes clear why
some problems of incorrect specification of the preference function and
those of the second order conditions can be avoided.
For, in this case we are interested ultimately in the trends of some im-
portant characteristics of the preference structure of an economy. These52
characteristics are derived theoretically from the preference function in
system (I.B.l.a) without knowledge of its exact mathematical specifica-
tion.
One of the main objectives of this section will be the restatement of the
"Deterministic-Static-Implicit-Determination"-(D.S.I.D.)-model for theore-
tical and empirical investigations concerning the questions how to measure
relative preferences and relative preference elasticities.
We shall indicate a possibility to investigate the dynsmical properties of
these entities and test their aptness as indicators of the degree of sta-
bility of the implicit social preferences.
Let us first define mathematically the economic concepts of marginal pre-
ferences, relative preferences, preference elasticities and relative pre-
ference elasticities.
The marginal preferences denote the marginal changes in the value of the
preference function ~(~,z,t) of system (I.B.l.a) resulting from marginal
changes in the value of the individual target- and instrumental variables
denoted by the elements y~ and zk of vectors x and z, being the arguments
of the preference function in a certain year t. So we can write:2~)
b u(y,z,t) w
` ~y (y,z.t) (~ - 1,...,J ; t - 1,...,T)
as the set of the marginal preferences of target variables in year
t - 1,...,T, and
b ~(y,z,t) M
dk ó zk ~~zk (y.z.t) (k - 1,...,K ; t- 1,...,T)
as the set of the marginal preferences of instrumental variables in year
t - 1, . ,T.
The relative marginal preferences or marginal rates of substitution are
defined as the ratios of the marginal preferences of the target- and in-




w i,~ ~y (y~z t)
j
(i,j - 1, . ,J ; t - 1, ..,T)
as the set of relative marginal preferences of the target variables with





' ~ (y.i.t) zj
(i,j - 1,.. ,K ; t - 1, . ,T)
as the set of relative marginal preferences of the instrumental variables




~i.j " cr (y,z,t) zj
(i - 1, . ,J ; j - 1, . ,K ; t - 1,...,T)
as the set of relative marginal preferences of the target variables with
respect to the instrumental variables in year t- 1,...,T.
Other convenient entities for characteristing the preferences structure
are the economic concepts of preference elasticity and relative preference
elasticity. They give insight into the relative sensitivity of the value
of the preference function to small changes in the value of the target-
and instrument variables. If we denote the elasticityoperator as E, we can
write:
E (~(y.?,t)) . y~
yj E(yj) -~yj(y,z,t).~(y~z~t) (j - 1,...,J: t~ 1,...,T)
as the set of preference elasticities of the target variables in year
t - 1,...,T, and
E (~(y,?,t)) w zk
dk E(zk) - wzk(y,z,t).~(y~z~t) (k - 1,...,K. t a 1,...,T)54
as the set of preference elasticities of the instrumental variables in
year t - 1,...,T.
As regards the relative preference elasticities, being the ratios of the
preference elasticities of the target- and instrumental variables with





~i,~ E (W(y,?.t)) . ~y (y.z.t) Y~
E (Y~) ~
(i,j - 1, ..,J ; t - 1, . ,T)
as being the set of relative preference elasticities of the target vari-
ables with respect to each other in year t- 1,...,T,
E (t~(Y,z,t) ) ~
i~j
E (zi) ~zi (y'z't) zi
~i,~ E (W( y.?.t)) ~ w (i.~ - 1... ,K ; t - 1,.. ,T)
t~z (y,z,t).z~
E (z~)
as being the set of relative preference elasticities of the instrumental
variables with respect to each other in year t- 1,...,T, and
E (c.~(x,z,t))
E ÍYi)
~i~~ E (~(,Y,?.t)) ~ i




as being the set of relative preference elasticities of the target vari-
ables with respect to the instrumental variables in year t- 1,...,T.
With the help of the definitions stated herebefore we can indicate now why
we are able to avoid the problems as regards the a priori specification of
the preference function and those of the second order conditions.
Starting from system (I.B.l.e) we derive the mathematical formulation of
the first order conditions for having a maximum as follows.28j Writing the
Lagrange function in year t:
i (i - 1,.. .J ~ ~ - 1,...K;55
Lt
Lt - (~,z,v,x,~ ,v ,e,~,t) or
~
- w(y,z,t) - at f(~;z;v;x;~ ;v ;e;t) (I.B.l.b)
where ~t is the transposed ~t-vector of Lagrangean multipliers, we find
the first order relations by taking the first partial derivatives of Lt
with respect to the elements yj(j - 1,...,J), zk(k - 1, ...,K)
vi(i - 1,...,I) and an,t (n - 1,...,N) of the corresponding vectors x, z,
v and ~t, and setting them equal to zero i.e.
r .
~Y (~'z't) - FY (y' z' v' x' y' V' e' t) ~t
w w
wz (y,z,t) - Fz Íy; z; v: x: y; v, e; t) ~t
„ - -
01 - Fv ( ~; z; v. x; x; ~;?' t) ~t
02 - f (y; z- v. x. x ; v; e. t)
0 (I.B.l.c)
w
where wy(x,z,t) is the J x 1 vector of which the elements denote the mar-
ginal preferences with respect to the target variables; wz(~,z,t) is the
K X 1 vector with elements denoting the marginal preferences with respect
to the instrumental variables.
s :
Fy(~; z: v; x: x-; v-; e; t) ~t, Fg(~; z; v; x: y-; v-; e; t) at and
~
Fv(~; z; v; x; y; v; e; t) ~t are the mathematical expressions of the
partial derivatives of Lt without w(x,z,t) with respect to the elements of
y, z and v, where the latter vector v is the vector of the irrelevant
endogenous variables.
O1 is the I X 1 null-vector corresponding to the partial derivatives of
w(y,z,t) in Lt with respect to the elements of v.
02 is a N x 1 null-vector. 0 is a(2N t K) x 1 null-vector;
f(y; z; v; x; ~; v; e; t) - 0 is of course the original sidemodel of
system (I.B.l.a).56
As we saw already, the vectors Y, z, v, x, x, v, e represent in the
train of thought of the ex post approach, the already known values of the
corresponding variables, respectively constant terms, of the econometric
model of the economy concerned in a certain year t in the past.
We arrive now at the mathematical formulation of the first order condi-
tions of the mentioned inverted optimizing problem.
r
IN this case the unknowns in system (I.B.l.c) are the vectors c~y(y,z,t),
uz(y,z,t) and at.
- -
Rearranging the first order relations of system (I.B.l.c) and realizing
that f(y; z; v; x; y; v; e; t) - 0, we derive the mathematical system of
the inverted optimisationproblem as follows:
f . r
c.~y(x,z.t) - Fy(x,z,v,x,x ,v .e.t) ~t
11 N
~z(x,z.t) - Fz(y.z.~.x.y ,~ ,e,t) ~t
w - -




- F~(x,z,v,x,Y ,v ,e,t)
M
- F~(y,z,v,x,y ,v ,e,t)
M -
- F~~(y,z,v,x,x ,v ,e,t)
0 or
0 (I.B.l.d)
Where I is an (J t K) X(J t K) unit matrix and 0 is an I X(J t K) null
11 M 11
matrix; Fy, Fz, and F~ are J x N, K X N resp. I X N matrices of which the
elements are known. Considering systems (I.B.l.a)~(I.B.l.d) makes clear
that if we are able to prove that there always exists a function u(y,z,t)
for which the first order relations of (I.B.l.c) are necessary and also
sufficient to be imposed on the results for having its maxímum, we do not
need to integrate explicitely the second 'order' conditions in the mathe-
matical programming model in order to solve system (I.B.l.s). This means
that system (I.B.l.d) denotes also the necessary and sufficient conditions
to be imposed on the results of the inverted optimisation problem and, as
we shall show hereafter, if offers the just starting point for the ulti-
mate development of our D.S.I.D.-model.57
In the literature aforementioned proof is sometimes given by construction
only available if special conditions are satisfied.
However we have formulated a generalization of the proof in an earlier
paper.29) Because we are not interested in the numerical form of the pre-
ference function itself in the first place, we need not bother about the
second-order problems in the sense of having to let them enter explicitely
in our determination model as others have done. (see: section I.A.).
We called our new determination model for preference structures: "Determi-
nistic-Static-Implicit-Determination"-model. (D.S.I.D.-model). The quali-
fication "Deterministic" results from disregarding stochastic disturbance
terms. The model is "static" because optimisation concerns only one year
and so the dynamic econometric model can be considered as a static one as
concerns optimisation. This is because before performing the optimisation
procedure not only the values of the constant terms (e) and those of the
exogenous variables x are known but also those of the lagged endogenous
variables y and v of system (I.B.l.a). The same is true for the coeffi-
cients.
The determination model is an implicit model because it determines impli-
citely the preference structures underlying the assumed optimal decision-
making in the past.
Establishing the theoretical D.S.I.D.-model no a priori mathematical spe-
cification of the preference function is assumed; the only neccessary
input to be accepted is that some preference function is maximized by the
policy decision unit whereas this maximization is constrainted by the
dynamic linear model (I.A.2.a). Performing the optimisationprocedure using
the Lagrange technique and reformulating this with regard to the inverted
optimisationproblem (see (I.B.l.a)~(I.B.l.d)) we arrive at the linear and
homogeneous system of equations (I.B.l.d). The number of the elements of
w r
the vector containing the unknowns wy(y,z,t), wz(x,z,t) and ~t equals the
number of arguments of the unspecified preference function (y~(j-1,...,J;
zk(k-1,...,K)) plus the number of the constraints i.e. the number of equa-
tions of the dynamic linear model in year t. If we denote the matrix of
system (I.B.l.d), containing the known elements, with At and the vector of
unknown elements with ~t we can write instead of (I.B.l.d):
(I.B.l.e)58
System (I.B.l.e) will always be underdetermined if the number of target-
variables exceeds zero and if the syatem only relatea to one single year
t.
To get rid of this difficulty we start with normalizing system (I.B.l.e)
and get:
At.Pt - I.B.l.f)
by singling out the last element of the vector Pt, equaling it to the
arbitrary base-value 1.
Multiplication of this base-value witr the last column of the (N 4 K) x
(N t J t K) matrix A and changing the sign results in the (N t K) X 1
vector gt. So the Át-matrix of system (I.B.l.f) is of order (N t K) X(N t
J t K- 1). This system will be solved for the as yet unknown elements of
the (N f J t K- 1) X(1)-vector Pt up to the arbitrarily fixed value of 1
using a special generalized inverse technique i. e. making use of the
Moore-Penrose inverse.30)
If system (I.B.l.f) is consistent and its rank equals N t K whereas the
original unspecified preference function of system (Z.B.l.a) only contains
one target variable this technique boils down to the normal inverse tech-
nique which is well-known. However independently of this special situation
we can get a solution of system (I.B.l.f) by uaing the Moore-Penrose in-
verse technique and get:
Pt~u - At } 9t (I.B.1.B)
So the D.S.I.D.-model has been made up of the synthesis of the Lagrange-
multiplier- and the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse techniques. From the
geometrical point of view our method chooses in the hyperplane represen-
ting the degrees of freedom a point of minimum norm i.e. that of the mini-
mum euclidean distance:
Let the Least-Squares-Solution Norm be defined as:
min ~~ At'et - yt ~~2 (I.B.l.h)
Pt59
If system (I.B.l.f) is consistent, system (I.B.l.h) is solved by:
~t~0 - At t~t t(I - Át y At) rt (I.B.l.i)
where rt is an arbitrary (N t J f K- 1) X(1) vector;
pt,0
is a general (N t J t K- 1) x(1) Least-Squares-Solution (L.S.S.)-
optimum vector.
The minimum Euclidean Norm can be defined now as:
min ~~ pt,0 „2
rt
I.B.l.j)
for which the solution can be obtained, starting from (I.B.l.g), as fol-
lows: (If system (I.B.l.f) is consistent).
- t
pt,u - At ~t
I.B.l.k)
where pt'u is a Least-Least-Squares-Solution vector (L.L.S.S. vector)
which denotes the "unique' solution vector of system (I.B.l.f), satisfying
the minimum 'Euclidean Norm' condition. At} denotes the Moore-Penrose
Inverse of matrix At and is of order (N t K t J- 1) X(N t K).
Using this special concept of the generalized inverse and wheighting the
first (J t K) elements with one of them results in:
a) the selection of a vector of ratio values indicating the relative pre-
ferences of the target and instrument variables according to the defi-
nitions stated above, whatever the true value of the last element of
the pt vector of system (I.B.l.e), i.e. that of ~N~t, would be
(~N,t ~
0), in year t.
b) the possibility for a test of stability through time t(t - 1,...,T) of
the relative preferences. It is ímportant that the solution obtained by
minimizing the Euclidean Norm be very sensitive to variations in the
known elements referring to a certain year t, which biases them against
the null-Hypothesis (HO)-hypothesis, stability of relative preferences
or of the preference structure.60
In this case we want to see whether we are able or not to reject the
H~-hypothesis that preference structures are constant. If we are, there
are many possibilities to formulate other H~'s consisting of hypotheses
as regards the degree of stability and see which of them we cannot
reject. In earlier contributions we tried to get the best polynomial
curve fitting of the relative preference ratios through time. The good-
ness of fit was based on the analysis of variance using the F-test.
As already noted, in a forthcoming research memorandum we will broadly
demonstrate the principles of the generalized inverse technique.
The difference and interrelationship between some important concepts of
this inverse technique, especially with that of the Moore-Penrose one,
will then be discussed.
In the same exercise we shall make clear why the L.L.S.S.-vector ~t u of
systems (I.B.l.g) and (I.B.l.h) are the best starting points for determi-
nating relative preference structures of an economy in our case. In an-
other study we used Graybill's computing formula for the Moore-Penrose
inverse that appears to be the best one in terms of accuracy and speed of
computation.31)
Par. I.B.2. The interactive respecification mode132)
Another approach, slightly different from ours, also starts from implicit
preferences. Emphasizing, policy decisions do not follow simple repeated
optimisations authors as Ancot c.s. want to conduct policy experiments so
that the characteristics of planning behaviour can be 'observed' and esti-
mated. They argue, where policies can be treated as if derived from simu-
lated experiments, the information on which options were preferred or
rejected can be used to build up the associated preference structure via
an interactive planning scheme. Earlier examinations on the mechanics of
how implicit preferences can be constructed by a pseudo-simulation of a
given policy choice have been succeeded by an empirical determination of
the preferences implicit in the policy choices actually made by the Dutch
government, over 19~6-1980 inclusive. Their model of planning behavior is
of a stochastic and dynamic nature. T planning-intervals are considered
(t-1,...,T) each of which involves a vector of instruments, zt; a vector
of targets xt; and a vector of uncontrolled and uncertain variables, st.61
Let x' - ( ' . ,y'; z' . ,z') and s' - ( s',.. ,s'), and write their - ~1" ' T -1'' ' -T - -1 ' -T
corresponding ideal but infeasible paths for the policy variables as xd
and the policy failures as x- x- xd. The constraints, as perceived by
the planners, are represented by the econometric model:
~t - ft(~t' xt-,~' ?t' St) (I.B.2.a)
Linearizing this model about the sequence of historical values for zt and
st and then the successive linearisations stacking up to conform with x
results in the model
x - Rz t s (I.B.2.b)
where:
R11. D - r~ft~~z, if t 2 jl
R- :'. and
Rtj {l0 otherwise J` contains
numerical evaluations of the dynamic multipliers for some level of econo-
mic activity z and s. Deleting the equations for non-targets system
(I.B.2.b) can be rearranged as follows:
Iy - Rz - s
I(y - yd) - R(z - zd) - s-(I-R) xd
~I - R~ . x - s - ~I - R~ . xd
and if H-~I - R~ one can get:
Hx - s - Hxd - b
s is assumed to follow some unspecified probability density function with
known mean, Et(s), at each t. Besides Et(s) - E(s; 52) denotes the condi-
R,I'1. . . R,~,
tional expectation based on the information set, S2t and is available to62
each agent at the start of period t. The latter set comprises past values
of sll the variables, current expectations of the components of sttj, j)
0, current estimates of estimates of R, and so on. The only wish to rank x
values implies that some performance index can be associated with each x
through:
w - w(x) (I.B.2.c)
satisfying the minimal set of axioms consistent with rational choices i.e.
completeness, reflexivity and transitivity. For convenient sake the
authors assume also convexity and differentiability for (I.B.2.c).
In order to arrive at a policy decision rule a second order ap-
N
proximation to (I.B.2.c) about some feasible x- x - xd is given by
w-} x' Q x t y' x (I.B.2.d)
where Q-(~2w~~x ~x') ,~ and q--Q x~ t(~w~~x) ,~. The matrix Q is symme-
- - X - - X
tric and positive definite if (I.B.2.c) is strictly convex and twice dif-
ferentiable.
Taking xd as the true ideal policy vector and g- 0, the optimal decision
is given by:
M
x - min {w(x)~Hx - b - 0}
x





as an approximation, while the point at which Q is evaluated differs sig-
.
nificantly from x. Finally, b in (I.B.2.f) is replaced by its conditional - - ~
expectation at the moment of calculating x. The latter calculation is
repeated for each t- 1,...,T and starts from (I.B.2.f) using E1(b) and
proceeds by (I.B.2.f) with expectations to be updated to Et(b) for each t,
and this altogether with the appropriate adjustments to Q, H, g and b. The
N -
way how x can be represented at any stage of revision, from the initial63
calculation to the sequence of decisions actually implemented, is influen-
ced by the way how the conditioning information has been obtained. There-
fore, the author's estimation exercises for the analysis of the Dutch
preference structure recognise two sets of results i.e. the case of the
'open loop policies' and the one of the 'closed loop policies'. The former
case has been conditioned on the information of 1976, while the latter
case reflects the actual policy choices of 1976-198o rather than their
planned values. In this same case the non-controllable variables in each
information set were replaced by their realised values, and Et(Yt) re-
placed E1(yt), for t- 1,...,T in the construction of xp being any prefer-
red 'second' best but infeasible policy. This preferred policy vector is a
dominant part of the authors' idea of a planner's decision making. A
single planner is supposed to take some sequence of candidate policies
x(s) EF; s- 0, 1,... . His selection process is to rank the candidates
to:
llX(Sti) - Xpll2 ~ llX(s) - xpll2 (I.B.2.g)
Where ll.ll2 denotes the euclidean norm, while xd remains the ideal. A
satisfactorily selected policy recommendation requires the policy makers
to experiment interactively with different values of the xp vector in
order to find the closest feasible choice i.e.
x(P) - min ll x- xp ll2 subject to x- Rz t s (I.B.2.h)
- X - - - -
As a special case of (I.B.2.f), setting Q- I and xp - xd, the authors
consider the system:
x(P) -(I - H'(H H')-1H) xp t H'(H H')-ls (I.B.2.i)
and prove that every feasible policy, rationally chosen with respect to x
and according to some admissable preferences may be generated by fixing Q
- Q(~) and varying xd as necessary within (I.B.2.f). They call it the
'preferences implicit' procedure for policy selection and system (I.B.2.1)
is a demonstratíon of this possibility by Q(~) - I and with xd replaced by
the xp-sequence. A fully equivalent procedure, the 'preferences explicit'64
.
one is the other way around and generates every feasible x by varying Q
over the set of positive definite, symmetric normalised matrices, while xd
is fixed. For the aforementioned empirical Dutch policy study the second
interactive respecification model has been applied. Given a special ver-
sion of the Vintaff-II model, developed by the Dutch Central Planning
Bureau, they evaluated Q during the five successive years and special
interest was paid to the diagonal elements of this matrix by use of the
correlation matrix for the 'open loop' solution as well as for the 'closed
loop' one.
The latter results of their respecification experiment delivered a sub-
stantially more clarified preference structure compared with the former
ones, probably, as concluded by the authors, because the Dutch policy
strategy chrystalized, and became coherent with experience during the life
of the Dutch administration during that time.
Par. I.B.3. Evaluation, Notes and Bibliography
The foregoing review on establishing collective preferences shows an over-
whelming attention to objective functions whether or not explicitely used
in macro-economic planning behavior. The a priori approaches clearly ap-
pear to be second to the ex post ones. And, indeed, two main reasons as
Ancot c.s. speak about, are first the inevitable introduction in the case
of public policy of the difficulty that often a planning agency represents
a coalition of interests so that the policy solution model must incorpo-
rate a collective preference function which is capable of generating the
necessary consensus decisions. The many contributors to planning and their
substantially varying individual preferences seems to exclude the a priori
possibility and thus the explicit objective function approach has been
ruled out. A second important resson is that the many efforts in the lite-
rature to derive fixed policy reaction functions must be qualified as
unstable and low explsnatorily powered results.32~ On the other hand the
ex post approach to analysing collective planning behavior, starting from
the implicit preferences idea seems to be a more promiseful one. It recog-
nises that planning behavior involves constrained optimisation conditional
on expectations of the future while constraints and the information set65
are relatively well understood. Besides, it takes into account fully cons-
ciously policy decisions do not follow simple repeated optimisations.
Nevertheless, the determinationmodels of implicit preferences established
within the scope of the ex post approach still leave a number of problems
unsolved. However, in paragraph I.B.1 we saw how the D.S.I.D.-approach
takes care of results not being influenced anymore by the a priori func-
tional form of the preference function. Moreover, the problem of the se-
cond order conditions has been overcome by the use of the concept of rela-
tive preference elasticity. This is admissible because it has been proved
in the past that there always exists an objective function that will be
maximized by a policy decision unit.
The interative respecification model, discussed in paragraph I.B.2, starts
from implicit preferences too. The way how these preferences are recon-
structed by a pseudo-simulation of a given policy choice implies policy
experiments so that the characteristics of planning behavior can be 'ob-
served' and estimated in more detail compared with the D.S.I.D.-model's
way of doing. On the other hand the second order approximation to an un-
specified preference function, and the set of assumptions used in the
respecificationmodel, may be reasons perhaps why the estimates approximate
the true preference structure in a less precise way as those of the
D.S.I.D.-model. Especially, this will become more likely if the attention
is turned to test stability through time of relative preference elastici-
ties rather than to simulate the planning behavior in itself.66
Notes~
1) See the bibliography, in particular the numbers 12, 28, 47, 52, 68 and
70.
2) See the bibliography, numbers 8, 19. 37. anà 73.
3) See the bibliography, numbers 47, 48 and 49. Other results will be
published in the research memoranda, An exercise in welfare economics,
(III) and (IV), both forthcoming.
4) See the bibliography, number 39-
5) See the bibliography, number 38.
6) See the bibliography, in particular the numbers 52, 54, 60, 64, 66,
69. 71, 72, 74 and 81.
7) See the bibliography, in particular numbers 70, 74 and 75.
8) See the bibliography, in particular number 12.
9) See the bibliography, in particular numbers 5, 7, 10, 15, 22, 24, 30,
34. 35, 40. 45, 63. 64, 65 and 79.
10) The present bibliography shows this platform of adherence to our way
of thought.
11) See the bibliography, number 5.
12) See the bibliography, number 10.
13) See the bibliography, number 77.
14) See the bibliography, number 55-67
15) See the bibliography, number 47. Afterwards, we did not restrict our-
selves to this originally maintained hypothesis of an a priorily known
preference function. See also note 3).
16) See the bibliography, numbers 34 and 35.
17) See the bibliography, numbers 20, 21, 50 and 76.
18) See the bibliography, number 80.
19) See the bibliography, in particular numbers 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 13, 14, 16,
17, 18, 26, 27, 28, 29. 31. 32. 33. 45, 46, 47. 49. 53. 55. 56. 57.
58, 61, 62, 78, 81 and 82.
20) See the bibliography, number 69.
21) See the bibliography, number 53.
22) See the bibliography, number 13, 62 and 81.
23) See the bibliography, especially numbers 1, 8, 19. 23 and 73.
24) See the bibliography, numbers 2, 3. 4, 25. 29. 31. 55 and 70.
25) See the bibliography, numbers 47 and 49 and note 3).
26) See the bibliography, numbers 29 and 42. As ít will become clear later
on in our D.S.I.D.-model the Pseudo-Inverse technique plays an impor-
tant role. Sensitivity analysis demands in such cases big attention to
the pertubation theory. We refer to the Research Memorandum, An exer-
cise in welfare economics (III), forthcoming.
r w
27) Instead of ~y (~,z,t), we shall write often ~y for convenient sake.
J - ~
Such abbreviation is applied too to the other analogous expressions.
28) See the bibliography, numbers 1 and 11.68
29) See the bibliography, number 49.
30) We shall discuss this inverse technique in a more profound way in, An
exercise in welfare economics ( III), as Research Memorandum forthco-
ming.
31) See the bibliography, number 49.
32) See the bibliography, numbers 2, 3, 4, 28, 31, 32, 43 and 44.
33) See the bibliography, in particular the numbers 14, 16, 1~, 33 and 36.69
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